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Abstract
This study was conducted to address the need for additional financial statement fraud detection
techniques. Accruals were chosen as the focus of this study due to the high likelihood of
financial statement manipulation using accruals. Using the Dechow/Dichev accrual quality
model, this study tested whether or not accrual quality can be used as an indicator of financial
statement fraud. The study concluded that the Dechow/Dichev model found non-fraudulent
financial statements to have higher quality accruals than fraudulent financial statements. In
addition, accrual quality of non-fraudulent financial statements was found to be significantly
different from the accrual quality of fraudulent financial statements. Therefore, accrual quality
may be considered an indicator of fraudulent financial statement activity.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
Accruals are a normal part of business; however, the subjective nature of many accrual
transactions provides an opportunity for overstatement of revenues that will never be realized.
Because accruals are easily manipulated, this study focuses on accruals as an indicator of
financial statement fraud. The results add to the literature on fraud detection techniques that can
be used by all stakeholders who analyze financial statements.
Background of the Problem
After several notorious accounting scandals in the early 2000s, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 was enacted to increase public confidence in corporate financial statements. Regardless
of the increased requirements for executives and auditors, headlines involving corporate fraud
and material financial misstatements continue to be reported (Abassi, Albrecht, Vance, &
Hansen, 2012). Financial statement fraud makes up only 10% of all occupational fraud;
however, it is the costliest of all types of fraud in the workplace (ACFE, 2016). Because of the
significance of accounting improprieties, increased pressure is on auditors to detect financial
statement fraud (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley, 2012; Murphy & Dacin, 2011).
Users of financial statements include, among others, investors, analysts, auditors, and
regulators. The capital markets rely on the financial information provided by companies and
additional fraud detection techniques may help aid in the exposure of inaccurate reporting. Just
as fraud perpetrators are continually finding new ways to commit fraud, corporate stakeholders
must continue to explore ways to detect it. Auditors are required to assess the risk of material
misstatement through analytical procedures (PCAOB, 2010). Management and investors also
have an interest in the likelihood of corporate fraud and use internal controls as well as analytical
procedures to aid in the detection process (Mangala & Kumari, 2015). This study adds to the
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literature regarding fraud detection by assessing the likelihood that accrual quality can be used as
an indicator of fraudulent financial statement activity.
Accrued revenues result from timing issues between the earning of revenue and the
receipt of cash. Accruals are a normal part of business; however, the subjective nature of many
accrual transactions provides an opportunity for overstatement of revenues that will never be
realized. Income-increasing accruals that are never fully realized must be corrected or reversed
in later years; however, managers may result to fraudulent transactions to offset the reversals in
order to avoid the negative effects on income (Perols & Lougee, 2011). The high likelihood of
fraudulent misstatements involving accruals necessitates an effective detection technique to
assess the risk created by the accruals (Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan, 2011; Mangala & Kumari,
2015; Perols & Lougee, 2011).
Corporate fraud research is continually developing to include more advanced ways of
detecting fraud, including data mining techniques as analytical tools (Mangala & Kumari, 2015;
Bolton & Hand, 2002; Bian, Cheng, Yang, Yuan, & Li, 2016; Sharma & Panigrahi, 2012). The
most recent literature on specific fraud detection techniques explores income tax expense
(Killen, 2016), price-earnings ratio (Weske & Benuto, 2015), and cash flows (Scott, 2012) as
indicators of fraud. Other recent studies that are broader in scope evaluate the relationships
between firm life cycle and fraud (Chang, 2015) as well as corporate culture and fraud risk
(Wang & Fargher, 2015). Interestingly, one study created a language-recognition tool to identify
the likelihood of fraud based on words in financial reports (Purda & Skillicorn, 2015) and
another explored digital analysis to predict fraud (Roxas, 2011). Despite the variety of fraud
detection literature, a gap exists regarding the detection of fraudulent financial reporting related
specifically to revenue accrual misstatements.
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Problem Statement
The problem addressed is the lack of fraud detection techniques available to corporate
stakeholders to assess the risk of fraudulent financial statements associated with revenue
accruals. Accruals have been found to be high in years of fraudulent financial statements
(Dechow et al., 2011). In addition, Perols and Lougee (2011) also found a relationship between
accruals and fraudulent financial statements. After reviewing the literature related to corporate
fraud prevention, Mangala and Kumari (2015) as well as Sharma and Panigrahi (2012)
recognized the need for additional research in the area of fraud indicators.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study is to examine the relationship
between accrual quality and financial statement fraud. Prior research has found that companies
with excessive accruals are more likely to produce fraudulent financial statements (Perols &
Lougee, 2011; Jones, Krishnan, & Melendrez, 2008). Although most companies will have
revenue accruals as a normal part of business, this study attempted to determine if accrual quality
may be an appropriate detection measure for financial statement fraud.
Nature of Study
Method
Quantitative research is an approach for “testing objective theories by examining the
relationship among variables” (Creswell, 2014, p. 4). Stake (2010) related quantitative research
to “linear attributes, measurements, and statistical analysis” (p. 11). Through statistical
measures, quantitative research allows the researcher to declare a certain level of confidence that
a finding is statistically significant (Stake, 2010). The use of the quantitative approach involves
the statistical analysis of a large sample size. The conclusions reached will be concluded from a
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pattern in the data (Creswell, 2014). The quantitative method was chosen for this study because
it involves the use of mathematically-based methods to determine the relationship between
accruals quality and fraudulent financial statement activity. Specifically related to accounting
research, quantitative methods have been found to be useful by providing data to which our
“theoretical generalization must be applied to be of any practical use” (Richardson, 2015, p. 74).
Qualitative research attempts to explain a situation or phenomenon that occurs (Creswell,
2014, p. 4) and relates to “human perception and understanding” (Stake, 2010, p. 11).
Qualitative research is interpretive, subjective, and situational (Stake, 2010). If a qualitative
method was chosen for this study, the conclusions reached would be greatly limited due to the
small, situational sample size (Stake, 2010). While the qualitative method is often used in
accounting research (Richardson, 2015), it was not chosen for this study because the focus is not
on one particular instance of accounting fraud but on an overall financial statement fraud
detection technique involving revenue accruals quality.
The mixed method merges the quantitative and qualitative methods together by including
elements of each. Although results of a mixed-method study are usually considered very strong,
the complexity of the design is very time-intensive and calls for “clear, visual models to
understand the details and the flow” as well as extensive data collection (Creswell, 2014, p. 219).
The mixed method was not practical for this research because the study tested the null hypothesis
that there is no relationship between accrual quality and financial statement fraud (Creswell,
2014, p. 3).
Design
This study has a correlational design which describes the relationship between variables
(Vogt, Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2014) as well as the nature and magnitude of the relationship
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between variables (Salkind, 2010). The correlational design achieved the purpose of this study
which was to examine the relationship between accrual quality and financial statement fraud.
The comparison of the revenue accrual quality of fraudulent financial statements to revenue
accrual quality of non-fraudulent financial statements determined if accrual quality can be used
(and if so, with what certainty) as a financial statement fraud detection technique.
Other quantitative research designs, which were not appropriate for this study, include
experimental and descriptive designs. The experimental and quasi-experimental designs of
quantitative research were not appropriate for this study because there is no intervention with
pre-tests and post-tests (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017). These designs call for independent,
dependent, and control variables as well as a control procedure with the intention of identifying a
cause and effect relationship (Salkind, 2010). This study compared historical data from financial
statements with no new intervention or procedure to the data.
The descriptive, or survey, approach calls for the administration of a survey to a random
sample of a population or an entire population (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017). Surveys are used
to “observe trends, attitudes, or opinions of the population of interest” (Edmonds & Kennedy,
2017, p. 133). This study compared historical data (retrospective analysis) to determine the
relationship between variables.
Research Question
This study examined the relationship between revenue accruals quality and financial
statement fraud. Prior research found that companies with excessive, or poor quality, accruals
are more likely to produce fraudulent financial statements (Perols & Lougee, 2011; Jones et al.,
2008). In order to evaluate the usefulness of an accruals quality ratio to detect fraud, the
following research question was developed:
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Q1: To what extent does revenue accruals quality differ for public companies with
detected financial statement fraud compared to public companies with no detected financial
statement fraud?
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses was tested:
H10: There is no statistically significant difference in revenue accruals quality for
companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without
detected financial statement fraud.
H1a: There is a statistically significant difference in revenue accruals quality for
companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without
detected financial statement fraud.
To test this hypothesis, the financial statements of fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms
were analyzed to determine the accrual quality of each firm. Once calculated, the results were
compared to determine if there was a statistically significant difference. It was expected that the
accrual quality of fraudulent firms would be significantly worse than the accrual quality of nonfraudulent firms. In addition, an independent t-test was used to determine if there was a
statistically significant relationship between accrual quality and financial statement fraud. It was
expected that the accrual quality of fraudulent financial statements would be lower than the
accrual quality of non-fraudulent financial statements.
Theoretical Framework
The far-reaching consequences of financial statement fraud make the identification of
fraud detection techniques an ongoing concern for academic researchers, regulators, and
practitioners (D’Amico & Mafrolla, 2013; Bolton & Hand, 2002; Sharma & Panigrahi, 2012;
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Abassi et al., 2012). The most basic and widespread fraud theory, the fraud triangle, is a central
theory for this study and is discussed first in this section. Next, theories specifically related to
financial statement fraud and accrual-related fraud are examined. All of these philosophies
provide the theoretical basis for the development of this study.
The Fraud Triangle
Originally developed in 1953 by Donald Cressey, the fraud triangle includes three
characteristics that are present when someone commits a fraudulent act: pressure, opportunity,
and rationalization (Cressey, 1953). This theory has been widely adopted by accounting
regulators and is included in the authoritative literature in the Statement on Auditing Standard
(SAS) No. 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 2002). SAS No.
99 includes an appendix that explains the three characteristics of the fraud triangle and lists risk
factors for each. This section discusses the original three parts of the fraud triangle and
concludes with the evolution of the fraud triangle to include more characteristics.
Pressure. Pressure is one of the incentives that motivates an individual to commit fraud
(Cressey, 1953). The pressure can come from one or more sources. Financial pressure may be
related to personal financial disaster due to bankruptcy, gambling, or addiction (Dellaportas,
2013). Organizational financial disaster may be a result of poor financial performance or
ambitious earnings targets (Lokanan, 2015; Roden, Cox, & Kim, 2016). Social pressures include
the appearance of success and egotistical attributes that motivate fraudulent behavior in order to
influence or impress others (Dellaportas, 2013).
Opportunity. Opportunity must exist in order for fraud to be committed (Cressey,
1953). In many cases, executives and managers are in the position to override controls giving
them the opportunity to alter financial reports (Dellaportas, 2013). Staff-level accountants may
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experience a lack of controls that provides an opportunity for embezzlement or misappropriation
of funds (Murphy & Dacin, 2011). Accountants and auditors are generally seen as honorable
and trustworthy individuals; therefore, stakeholders may take their words and reports as given
with no questions asked (Dellaportas, 2013). Others may just not understand the complex
accounting rules and processes and choose to not investigate or ask questions. This lack of
checks-and-balances provides the perfect opportunity for those in trustworthy positions to
conduct fraudulent activity.
Rationalization. The final item that must be present for fraud to occur is rationalization
(Cressey, 1953). By telling themselves “they won’t get caught” or “everyone does it,” fraudsters
make themselves believe that their actions are acceptable and are then able to commit the act
while remaining in their moral comfort zone (Cressey, 1953; Lokanan, 2015; Dellaportas, 2013).
Additionally, the manager may weigh the cost and benefit of the action and realize that the “big”
outcome is worth the “small” risk (Murphy & Dacin, 2011).
Evolution of the fraud triangle. Accounting fraud has certainly grown in complexity
since Cressey’s original observations in 1953 (Dorminey et al., 2012; McMahon, Pence,
Bressler, & Bressler, 2016). Numerous studies on the fraud triangle as it relates to accounting
fraud has led to the addition of behavioral-based characteristics including capability, ideology,
arrogance/ego/entitlement, and coercion (Dorminey et al., 2012; Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004).
Although these additional characteristics are not unanimously adopted and included in the
regulatory accounting standards, they have been proven to be related to accounting fraud
(Soltani, 2014).
In addition to behavioral considerations, Lokanan (2015) argued that institutional
practices and societal pressures influence fraud just as much as the original three fraud triangle
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characteristics. His research on the socio-political influences on fraud found that these additional
characteristics should also be considered as financial fraud risk factors (Lokanan, 2015).
Dorminey et al. (2012) suggested ongoing research related to the causes of accounting fraud in
order to strengthen the audit risk and detection process.
Financial Statement Fraud Theories
General fraud theories that relate specifically to financial statement fraud include agency
theory (acting in self-interest), prospect theory (focus on earnings), and motivated-reasoning
theory (hidden bias; Murphy & Dacin, 2011). Agency theory adds to the discussion of financial
statement fraud by explaining the motivation behind the fraud and explaining the relationship
between the employer/company (the principal) and the employee/manager (the agent). The
theory recognizes that the principal and agent will each have different attitudes toward risk and
each will act in their own self-interest (Eisenhardt, 1989). Regarding financial statement fraud,
the contract between the principal and agent (employment contract) may provide an incentive for
the manager to commit fraud in order to further their own self-interest (i.e., salary bonus for
meeting an earnings target; Salterio & Webb, 2006). Although individuals may act more
honestly than the agency theory suggests (Salterio & Webb, 2006), company stakeholders should
be aware of the conflicts involved in the employer/employee relationship.
Prospect theory was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as a descriptive model
of decision making while under risk. Although originally applied to gambling and insurance, the
prospect theory also adds to the discussion of financial statement fraud because it suggests
decision makers (managers) will act in a way that will meet a goal/prospect (i.e., earnings target).
According to the prospect theory, decision makers may be risk averse or risk seeking depending
on their previous experience (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Abdel-Khalik, 2014). If a previous
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risk resulted in a gain, the decision maker will be more cautious with future decisions in an
attempt to secure the increase in wealth; if a risk resulted in a loss, the decision maker will take
more risks in hopes of making up for the lost wealth (Abdel-Khalik, 2014). These actions go
against the rational choice theory that, after a risk pay off, the risk would be repeated (or if the
risk cost them wealth, the risk would be avoided).
The motivated reasoning theory suggests that specific goals affect one’s decision making
(Kunda, 1990). In other words, the motivation to meet a goal (i.e., earnings target) enhances the
use of strategies that are most likely to achieve the goal, including risky strategies (i.e., financial
statement fraud). Kunda (1990) concluded that motivations for decision making come from
either the desire to be accurate (accurate conclusion) or the desire to achieve a goal (directional
conclusion). In the case of financial statement fraud, both conclusions apply because financial
statements must be accurate and goal-oriented. Other justifications for committing financial
statement fraud may be monetary gain, improved social status (successfulness), or moral
justification (more people will be helped than hurt; Murphy & Dacin, 2011).
Accrual-Related Fraud Theories
The fraud triangle explains why people commit all types of fraud, not just financial
statement fraud. Therefore, the fraud triangle must be taken a step further to merge with
accounting- and accrual-related fraud theories in order to have a better understanding of why
people commit financial statement fraud. Using results from various research studies, Koch and
Wall (2000) developed four models that explain the use of excessive discretionary accruals to
commit financial statement fraud: (a) the occasional big bath theory, (b) the smooth income
theory, (c) the live for today theory, and (d) the maximize variability theory. These theories
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support the current study by explaining the reasoning behind accrual-related fraud and are
explained and tied back to the fraud triangle discussion in the following paragraphs.
The occasional big-bath theory describes the motivation of a manager to use
discretionary accruals inappropriately in order to achieve quarterly earnings targets (Koch &
Wall, 2000). While every quarter’s target may not be reached, an occasional windfall created by
a fabulous quarter can provide job security and financial benefits for the manager. This model is
applicable to the pressure dimension of the fraud triangle.
Under the smooth income theory, managers use earnings management techniques to alter
accruals in order to provide a more stable earnings timeline (Koch & Wall, 2000). If actual
earnings exceed the target, the manager will reduce reported earnings. If actual earnings are less
than the target, the manager will increase reported earnings. Generally, these actions are taken
when there is a financial penalty for earnings not being on target or if the manager thinks that
stakeholders appreciate stability (Zhang, 2016; Koch & Wall, 2000). This theory is related to the
rationalization characteristic of the fraud triangle.
The live for today theory explains why managers participate in earnings management by
always minimizing discretionary accruals and, therefore, always maximizing net income (Koch
& Wall, 2000). Perhaps the individual is planning to retire or leave the company and chooses to
maximize current period earnings. This shortsightedness effect could also be a result of reaching
earnings targets in order to keep his/her job. This action would fall under the pressure and
rationalization dimensions of the fraud triangle.
Finally, the maximize variability theory is used when managers manipulate discretionary
accruals to move further away from their earnings target (Koch & Wall, 2000). This risky move
would be taken by a manager in order to prepare for a stellar performance in a future quarter. By
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manipulating accruals to under-report their current earnings, future earnings that may actually be
mediocre will appear to be much higher than expected. This method falls under the
rationalization and pressure realms of the fraud triangle.
This study tested the usefulness of a revenue accrual quality ratio as an indication of
financial statement fraud. The theoretical basis for the development of this study is explained by
combining the concepts of the fraud triangle with specific accrual-related fraud theories.
Understanding the characteristics of fraud combined with the psychology of why people commit
financial statement fraud creates a theoretical framework for this study.
Definition of Terms
Accrual quality: the measure of the extent to which working capital accruals are realized
in future cash flows. If cash flows are not eventually realized, the quality of the recorded
accruals was low. If cash flows are subsequently realized, the quality of the previously recorded
accruals was high (Dechow & Dichev, 2002).
Discretionary accrual: an accrual that is not imperative to the main function of the
business and may or may not eventually be realized. An example would be estimated upcoming
executive bonuses. The dollar amounts of discretionary accruals are subjective, estimated, and
provide an opportunity for fraudulent manipulations (Ghosh & Olsen, 2009).
Earnings management: management’s use of judgement in financial reporting (or
structuring of transactions) to mislead or influence stakeholders of the company. Generally,
earnings management is used when the firm’s performance is poor or to meet contractual
requirements (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Earnings management is not necessarily fraudulent; the
use of earnings management to mislead users of the financial statements is fraudulent. Accrual-
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based earnings management may include the under-accruing of expenses, delaying an asset
write-down, or recognizing revenue prematurely (Bartov & Cohen, 2009).
Financial statement fraud: occurs when firms intentionally violate accounting rules and
regulations to create incorrect financial statements (Roxas, 2011). Financial statement fraud may
also be referred to as misstated financial statements or fraudulent financial statements.
Material misstatement: a significant error, either intentional or accidental, in the financial
statements of a company. The materiality threshold changes depending on the size of the
company, among other things. Intentional material misstatements are considered fraud (Gupta &
Gill, 2012).
Nondiscretionary accrual: an accrual that is caused by the operations of the business
(Ayers, Jiang, & Yeung, 2006). The firm is obligated to pay the expense. An example is an
electric bill received but not paid. The amount is specific and exact and can be verified.
Revenue accruals: revenue that is reported on the income statement but cash has not been
received (Ghosh & Olsen, 2009). Instead of receiving cash, the firm creates a receivable due
from the customer to the company. The receivable is expected to be collected in a future period.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
This study used information obtained through the Security and Exchange Commission’s
(SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) database. Because enforcement
actions are issued with significant investigation, information within the AAERs is assumed
accurate and complete. Once a company was identified for this study, additional research was
conducted to make sure the information provided by the AAER database was up-to-date and the
investigation was considered ongoing or concluded. Because the sample for this study included
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companies with fraudulent financial statements, the additional research mitigated the risk that the
investigation by the SEC was dropped, but not updated in the AAER database.
Limitations
The sample was limited to AAERs issued in the years of 2015 and 2016. Only those
companies identified by the SEC and issued an AAER during those years were included in the
sample. Another limitation of this study is that it attempted to identify the relationship between
accrual quality and financial statement fraud, but did not attempt to determine causation.
Delimitations
The sample of this study was limited to AAERs issued during the years of 2015 and 2016
only. The SEC issues AAERs to any publicly traded U.S company that has been identified and
investigated for committing fraud (Perols & Lougee, 2011); therefore, this study only
investigated the relationship between revenue accruals and intentional fraudulent activity. In
addition, this study was based only on public company information. No privately held
companies or governmental agencies were included in the selected sample. The conclusions
reached by this research are limited in scope concerning fraud detection by revenue accrual
quality only. Other fraud detection techniques were not considered in this study.
Significance of Study
Reduction in Gaps
This study adds to the literature on detecting fraudulent financial statement activity by
using an accruals-related analytical procedure. Although there are many ways to detect financial
statement fraud, this study adds to the current literature available on fraud detection techniques
by providing evidence of the usefulness (or uselessness) of using accrual quality to detect
financial statement fraud. Firms are constantly finding more creative ways to commit fraud;
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therefore, fraud researchers must also continually revise their detection techniques (Mangala &
Kumari, 2015; Abassi et al., 2012; Bian et al., 2016).
Implications for Biblical Integration
Just as Christians have rules and examples to follow given by our Lord, businesses have
rules and regulations to follow in the conduct and reporting of their operations. Governing
authorities (the FASB, SEC, etc.) issue business rules and we are instructed to follow the laws
and rules provided by these authorities (Romans 13:1-2). However, Biblical concepts may also
be applied to business situations so that the tough ethical questions have clear answers
(Chewning, Eby, & Roels, 1990). Unfortunately, the Bible does not specifically address many of
the issues that we encounter in today’s business world. However, the mention of integrity and
honesty throughout the Bible (just a few examples include Matthew 5:8, Proverbs 21:3, Psalm
25:21, Psalm 112, NIV) give instructions on how to live Christ-like lives and run businesses in a
Christian way. How wonderful would it be if all businesses would merge the Biblical principles
of integrity and honesty with the accounting regulations set forth for them to follow?
Businesspeople face ethical issues of all kinds including dishonesty, corruption,
embezzlement, fraud, and pay inequality (Gill & Erisman, 2016). For this study, which focuses
specifically on the ethical issue of fraud, the application of Biblical principles to the fraud
triangle characteristics of pressure and rationalization provide insight on ways that Christians can
overcome this unethical behavior. Pressure can come from a variety of sources including
financial pressures and social pressures (Dellaportas, 2013). The Bible provides direction on
how to properly manage our finances in order to avoid personal financial disaster (Proverbs 3:910) as well as how to define success in order to avoid social pressures (Matthew 16:26). Each of
these passages provides an understanding of what God intends for us to do with our money and
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God’s definition of success (Idleman, 2013). Success should not be measured by the acquisition
of monetary wealth but by the acquisition of eternal life (Luke 18:18-30).
In addition to pressure, rationalization is also present when fraud occurs (Cressey, 1953;
Lokanan, 2015; Dellaportas, 2013). The act of rationalization involves the weighing of the costs
and benefits prior to committing the fraud and concluding that the benefits of the illegal action
are worth the risk (Murphy & Dacin, 2011). Jesus said, “For what will it profit a man if he gains
the whole world and forfeits his soul?” (Matthew 16:26). This passage is a reminder of the true
costs of unethical behavior and reverses the justification for the fraudulent act. Putting God first
and removing the idolatry of monetary and social success reduces the pressure and
rationalization present during the fraudulent activity (Albertson, 2016).
Christianity is a lived experience that extends far past the walls of a church. We are
called to “always strive to do what is good for each other and for everyone else” in all parts of
our lives (1 Thessalonians 5:15). Christians in business are called to serve God by enabling their
communities to flourish (Van Duzer, 2010) and this study aids authorities, auditors, and
management in the detection of fraud. By detecting misstatements in financial statements, we
are adhering to this calling by making the information more useful and accurate for all
stakeholders’ decision making.
Relationship to Field of Study
Accounting is commonly known as the language of business because every organization
has financial transactions. The manipulation of financial statements is the costliest type of fraud
in the workplace (ACFE, 2016). In order for financial statements to be informative to
stakeholders, they must be accurate. This study is directly related to the accounting cognate
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because it is the analysis of financial statements (accruals quality in particular) to detect
fraudulent activity.
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
This literature review covers the most important topics that support this study of using
revenue accruals quality as an indicator of financial statement fraud. To begin, accrual- and
auditing-related accounting standards are examined as set forth in professional and practitioner
materials. Following the discussion of professional literature, academic literature is reviewed.
Because the accounting profession is subject to oversight by governing agencies, it is imperative
to mention the regulations and standards that accountants and auditors must follow prior to
evaluating fraud theory and the most recent research studies in the academic literature. Included
in the review of academic literature are topics of (a) financial statement fraud, (b) accruals and
earnings management, (c) theoretical framework, (d) the use of accruals in accounting research,
and (e) the use of accruals to detect financial statement fraud (including research variables and
accrual ratios). Figure 1 below summarizes the topics of this literature review in graphic form.

Figure 1: Literature Review Concept Map.
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Professional Literature
Accounting professionals are required to adhere to principles set forth by several
organizations including the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA; Johnstone, Gramling, & Rittenberg, 2016; Kassem & Higson, 2012;
Dorminey et al., 2012). Therefore, accounting standards and regulations must be acknowledged
in any study related to financial reporting. Particularly related to this study are the FASB’s
Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2014-09, the FASB’s Statement of Financial Accounting
Concept No. 8, the PCAOB’s Auditing Standard 2110, and the AICPA’s guidance on the
Statement on Auditing Standard (SAS) No. 99. The most significant guidance available in the
professional and practitioner literature is discussed in the next paragraphs.
FASB ASU 2014-09. On May 28, 2014, the FASB issued ASU 2014-09, Revenue from
Contracts with Customers (Topic 606). This standard update is a result of a joint effort between
the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to clarify and harmonize
the principles for revenue recognition using United States Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (U.S. GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). ASU 2014-09
provides a principle-based approach for revenue recognition and eliminates various industry- and
transaction-specific rules making revenue recognition uniform for all reporting entities. In
addition, enhanced disclosures are required to provide further analysis of reported revenue
(FASB, 2014). As a result, U.S. GAAP and IFRS are now closely aligned to allow a fair
comparison of company revenues regardless of industry or transaction type.
The key concept of ASU 2014-09 is that an entity should “recognize revenue when (or
as) it satisfies a performance obligation by transferring a promised good or service to a
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customer” (FASB, 2014, p. 5). If a contract contains many different performance obligations,
each should be separated with an appropriate monetary value. Revenue should be recognized as
each performance obligation is completed rather than based on the completion percentage of the
entire contract.
This basic accrual principle is the framework for revenue reporting; however, ASU 201409 clarifies and simplifies the revenue recognition process to provide comparability of revenues
from a variety of industries and capital markets (FASB, 2014). Accrual accounting is an integral
part of the current study; therefore, an understanding of this updated revenue recognition
standard is an imperative part of the literature review. However, this new standard does not
affect this study because early adoption of ASU 2014-09 is not permitted for public entities.
Historical company data (prior to 2017) was analyzed in this study (Rosenhouse, 2014).
FASB SFAC No. 8. FASB Concept Statement No. 8 defines accrual accounting and
explains the justification for using accrual accounting when reporting the performance of an
organization. It states that accrual accounting provides better information on the economic
activity of the business than the cash-basis accounting method (FASB, 2010). Cash-basis
accounting relies on inflow of cash to record revenue and an outflow of cash to record an
expense. However, revenue may actually be earned without cash being received in the current
period and expenses incurred without cash being paid in the current period. This timing problem
is mitigated by using the accrual basis where revenues are booked when earned and expenses are
booked when incurred (Dechow, 1994). There is a trade-off, however, in using the accrual basis
rather than the easy-to-prove cash basis because managers have some discretion over the accrued
amounts (Dechow, 1994; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Therefore, even though the accrual basis may
provide a more accurate picture of the business’s activity, it also provides an opportunity for
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fraudulent financial statement activity through subjective estimates of discretionary accruals
(Perols & Lougee, 2011; Dechow, 1994; Healy & Wahlan, 1999). Nonetheless, standard setters
agree that the accrual basis more accurately reports a firm’s performance because accruals must
be “objective and verifiable” which limits management’s discretion when reporting accruals
(Dechow, 1994, p. 8).
FASB Concept Statement No. 8 relates directly to this study because it defines the
purpose of financial reporting as providing “financial information about the reporting entity that
is useful to (stakeholders) in making decisions about providing resources to the entity” (FASB,
2010, p. 1). Stakeholders are identified as investors, lenders, creditors, and regulators and the
importance of accurate and useable information is implied throughout this statement (FASB,
2010). This concept statement highlights the importance of accurate financial statements and,
therefore, the need for tools to aid in the detection of fraudulent financial statement activity.
Fraud-related auditing standards and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The PCAOB
and the AICPA are the main governing agencies for audit procedures. The PCAOB was created
as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) to help improve investor confidence in
corporations. The PCAOB’s primary purpose is to oversee public accounting firms that audit
publicly-traded corporations. The PCAOB establishes and enforces rules on auditing, quality
control, ethics, and independence (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). The PCAOB’s Auditing
Standard No. 2110 provides guidance related to identifying and assessing risk of material
misstatements. Under this standard, auditors are required to perform analytical procedures in
order to identify unusual relationships involving revenue accounts (PCAOB, 2010). The
identification of unexpected account relationships might indicate a material misstatement,
including material misstatement due to fraud (PCAOB, 2010). This study of accruals as an
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indicator of financial statement fraud adds to the literature on analytical procedures and the risk
assessment process.
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (SAS 99), issued by the AICPA’s Auditing
Standards Board (ASB), describes fraud and sets documentation and engagement requirements
for the auditing team. In addition, risk assessment, communication, and controls are addressed
as they relate to audit procedures. The AICPA’s guidance on SAS No. 99 provides criteria for
auditors’ fieldwork related to assessing the likelihood of fraud (Dorminey et al., 2012). Fraud
risk is defined as “the risk that the client and its management would intentionally cause the
financial statements to be materially misstated” (Hammersley, Johnstone, & Kadous, 2011, p.
86). Auditors are required to conduct a preliminary fraud risk assessment in the planning stage
of the audit because thorough planning increases the likelihood of a high quality audit (Power,
2013; Raslan, Hegazy, & Eldawla, 2016; Mangala & Kumari, 2015). AU §316.28 provides
examples of analytical procedures that may be red flags that are helpful in identifying unusual
activity (AICPA, 2007). For example, the comparison of sales volume (as determined from
recorded revenue amounts) with production capacity is useful since excess sales volume over
production capacity may be indicative of recording fictitious sales. Another example provided
involves a trend analysis of monthly revenues and monthly sales returns during and shortly after
the reporting period. This procedure may indicate the existence of undisclosed side agreements
with customers to return goods that would affect revenue recognition (AICPA, 2007). It must be
noted that the presence of a red flag merely indicates the potential for financial statement fraud
and does not “ensure the presence of fraud” (Mangala & Kumari, 2015, p. 54). The current
study examines accruals quality as an indicator of financial statement fraud and adds to the
literature on analytical procedures that may help detect financial statement fraud.
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In addition to creating the PCAOB to oversee the audit process, the SOX Act of 2002
brought attention to the act of financial statement fraud by increasing criminal and civil penalties
for white-collar crime, increasing the requirements for disclosures, and specifying responsible
parties (corporate responsibility). Many studies have compared earnings management prior to
SOX and after SOX. Some studies indicate that earnings management increased significantly
after the implementation of SOX (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Bartov & Cohen, 2009) while other
studies suggest SOX resulted in very few changes in earnings management (Ghosh, Marra, &
Moon, 2010). A study by Cohen et al. (2008) suggested that real earnings management, as
opposed to accrual-based earnings management, increased after the passage of SOX. Bartov and
Cohen (2009) found similar results when they examined over 10,000 firm-quarter observations
ranging from 1987 through 2006 and applied a modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones,
1991) to compare earnings management in pre-SOX years and post-SOX years. Although the
SOX’s oversight rules, stricter penalties, and increased regulations on financial reporting should
have deterred management from fraudulent financial reporting, Bartov and Cohen (2009) found
that earnings management actually increased in the post-SOX period.
On the other hand, Ghosh et al. (2010) examined over 9,000 observations from US
publicly traded firms between 1998 and 2005 and found “no evidence to suggest that the overall
level of earnings management declined following SOX” (p. 1145). Gavious and Rosenboim
(2013) evaluated the relationship between earnings quality, market conditions (stock price), and
government regulation (SOX). They found an increase in earnings quality (reduction in
abnormal accruals) just prior to the passage of SOX. Therefore, they concluded that the reduced
earnings management was due to the exposure of the many accounting scandals and an increase
in investor awareness rather than due to the passage of SOX (Gavious & Rosenboim, 2013).
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More recently, Jordan, Clark, and Pate (2015) examined the third decimal digit in EPS
and, prior to SOX, found a significant number of instances of earnings manipulation so that EPS
could be rounded up to the next penny. For periods after SOX, this form of earnings
management was practically eliminated (Jordan et al., 2015). The current study focused on
accrual-based earnings manipulation; these former studies show the inconsistencies in research
findings regarding earnings management and, therefore, the importance of more research in this
area.
“SOX’s impact on earnings management appears inconclusive at this point and further
research in the area is warranted” (Jordan et al., p. 154). Regardless of the existing guidance
available to auditors and the increased literature provided after the passage of SOX, Kassem and
Higson (2012) found that even more guidance related to fraud risk assessment is needed from
standard setters. They reviewed academic research studies to explore the reasons for the audit
expectation gap and to measure the efforts of standards setters to narrow the gap (Kassem &
Higson, 2012). They proposed that standard setters and external auditors are not doing enough
to detect financial statement fraud and there is, therefore, a gap that needs to be narrowed.
Because of the evidence of recent increases in earnings management and the difficulty in
detecting it, more earnings management research is warranted. This study adds to the fraud
detection and risk assessment literature by evaluating the relationship between accrual quality
and financial statement fraud.
Academic Literature
Although the professional/practitioner literature provides regulations and guidance for
accrual accounting and auditing accrued revenues, a review of the academic literature aids in the
practical implementation of the standards and procedures accountants and auditors are required
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to follow. This section of the literature review evaluates, defines, and discusses the following
topics: (a) financial statement fraud (including detection techniques and risk assessment), (b)
accruals and earnings management, (c) theoretical framework, (d) accruals in accounting
research, and (e) accruals to detect financial statement fraud (including research variables and
accrual ratios).
Financial statement fraud. Financial statement fraud is an ongoing problem; therefore,
the definition and evaluation of financial statement fraud has been part of academic literature for
decades. In fact, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) estimates that, of all
occupational fraud types, the largest median losses result from financial statement fraud (ACFE,
2016). Roxas (2011) defined financial statement fraud as the intentional violation of GAAP
through the manipulation of earnings. Gupta and Gill (2012) defined financial statement fraud as
“a deliberate misstatement of material facts by management in the books of account of a
company with the aim of deceiving investors and creditors” (p. 150). Fraud involves an
intentional act; therefore, it is important to prove that the misstatements were intentional rather
than accidental (Kim, Baik, & Cho, 2016). Accidental misstatements are usually smaller and
less significant errors than fraudulent misstatements that can cause drastic problems in the
financial markets (Kim et al., 2016).
Mangala and Kumari (2015) reviewed research from 1984 through 2014 and found that a
variety of fraud detection techniques are necessary to curb fraud effectively and more research is
needed regarding corporate financial reporting fraud. Many studies have attempted to improve
the fraud detection process including using techniques such as digital analysis (Roxas, 2011),
annual report word choice (Purda & Skillicorn, 2015), and data mining (Gupta & Gill, 2012). In
addition, data mining is becoming more popular as a fraud detection technique because of the
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ability to handle large, complex quantities of financial data (Sharma & Panigrahi, 2012).
Nonetheless, numerous researchers emphasize the importance of new detection techniques that
can keep up with the constantly changing fraudulent activity and can warn stakeholders of the
potential of fraud (Abassi et al., 2012; Bolton & Hand, 2002; Golden, Meyerson, Brockett, &
Wortham, 2013; McMahon et al., 2016; Bian et al., 2016).
As discussed earlier in the professional literature section, auditors must assess the risk of
fraud as part of their audit procedures. One part of the fraud risk assessment is an evaluation of
accruals. While abnormal accruals may not be the most important red flag for the detection of
financial statement fraud, they are certainly one of many areas that should be considered
(Gullkvist & Jokipii, 2013). Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2001) found that auditors do not
consider high accruals as an indicator of future earnings problems. They contend that auditors
may think that it is not their responsibility to alert investors of possible future financial statement
fraud or maybe they lack the sophisticated detection techniques to signal such earnings
management (Bradshaw et al., 2001). Nonetheless, additional research is warranted regarding
audit procedures to detect fraud as well as the responsibility of auditors to alert investors of the
potential for future financial statement fraud (Bradshaw et al., 2001; Sharma & Panigrahi, 2012).
Accruals and earnings management. A firm’s revenues are made up of (1) income that
has been earned and cash received (cash flows) and (2) income that has been earned but cash has
not yet been received (accrued revenues; Ghosh & Olsen, 2009). The quality of earnings is
generally defined as the “magnitude of estimation errors in accruals” (McNichols, 2002, p. 61;
Dichow & Dichev, 2002). The estimation error is defined as the “difference between the amount
accrued and the amount realized” through cash flows (McNichols, 2002, p. 62). Although the
recording of accrued transactions is allowed by GAAP and a common practice, this procedure
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can easily turn into fraudulent earnings management if used to mislead the users of financial
statements (Ayers et al., 2006; Badertscher, Collins, & Lys, 2012; D’Amico & Mafrolla, 2013;
Dechow, Hutton, Kim, & Sloan, 2012; Perols & Lougee, 2011; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Dechow,
1994; Foster & Shastri, 2013; Gerakos, 2012). The fraudulent use of accruals results in accruals
that do not reverse in future periods while the correct use of accruals will result in the realization
(or reversal) of the accrued amounts (Perols & Lougee, 2011).
Accounting crime investigators stress the importance of fraud indicators related to
financial statement fraud more than those related to internal control weaknesses (Gullkvist &
Jokipii, 2013). While the ambiguity of accruals may make them difficult to use as variables in
the detection of financial statement fraud (Ball, 2013) and some doubt that accruals are useful in
detecting fraud because they are already heavily examined by auditors (Raslan et al., 2016),
accruals are nonetheless a main avenue for financial reporting manipulation and should continue
to be a topic of discussion and research.
Theoretical framework. Fraud theory is a broad subject that explains the characteristics
of fraudsters and the environment in which fraud occurs (Dorminey et al., 2012). A clear
understanding of the reasoning and psychology of those who commit (or are likely to commit)
fraud is important in identifying and reducing financial statement fraud risk (Murphy & Dacin,
2011; Power, 2013; Brytting, Minogue, & Morino, 2011). Auditors must understand the
motivations and conditions present when fraud takes place in order to accurately assess the
potential for fraud and develop their audit procedures according to the risk presented (Dorminey
et al., 2012). The following theories make up the theoretical framework for this study by
explaining the conditions present when fraud occurs: the fraud triangle, accrual-related fraud
theories, agency theory, prospect theory, and motivated reasoning theory.
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Fraud triangle. Originally developed by Cressey (1953) in the mid-20th century, the
fraud triangle explains the circumstances present when fraud occurs: opportunity, rationalization,
and pressure/incentive. While each part of the fraud triangle is present when fraud occurs, they
do not have to be present in equal amounts (Brytting et al., 2011). Wolfe and Hermanson (2004)
added a fourth characteristic, capability, which includes the traits and abilities that must be
present for fraud to be perpetuated in the presence of the other three characteristics. Evidence
from their vast fraud investigation experience led them to the conclusion that a fraudster must
also, in addition to the fraud triangle circumstances, possess certain traits in order to actually go
through with a fraudulent act (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004). Traits include the knowledge of
business processes, the intelligence to exploit internal controls, a strong ego, a persuasive
personality, the successful management of stress, and the ability to lie effectively (Wolfe &
Hermanson, 2004). Dellaportas’s (2013) study of inmate accountants supported Wolfe and
Hermanson’s findings that specialized knowledge and a trustworthy personality are necessary for
fraud to occur. Accountants’ unique position in the company allows them to gain trust and
become very familiar with the internal control processes, including how to bypass the controls
(Dellaportas, 2013).
Soltani (2014) argued that the fraud triangle should also consider the environmental,
regulatory, and ethical climate of the organization. Additionally, Lokanan (2015) challenged the
fraud triangle as a legitimate theory when assessing fraud risk and concluded that the fraud
triangle provides a “limited conception of fraud” and should not be solely relied upon by auditors
when assessing fraud risks (p. 220). He argued that the corporate culture and surrounding
environment (including institutional processes and practices) should be considered when
evaluating conditions and behaviors that could lead to fraud (Lokanan, 2015). Findings of
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McMahon et al. (2016) agreed with Lokanan that auditors should move beyond the fraud triangle
when evaluating fraud risks.
The term “fraud” includes actions of petty employee theft, embezzlement of funds,
significant fraudulent financial reporting, and misappropriation of assets (Soltani, 2014).
Because of this broad definition of fraud, it is important to narrow down the discussion of the
fraud triangle to financial statement fraud in particular. Roden et al. (2016) applied the concepts
of Cressey’s fraud triangle in predicting corporate fraud and, like Lokanan (2015), found that
corporate culture and the structure of the board of directors is an important part of the fraud risk
discussion. They applied the characteristics of opportunity, pressure, and rationalization to 103
firms that had been issued AAERs by the SEC for financial statement fraud from 2003-2010.
After comparing the results to those of a matched sample of similar, non-fraudulent firms, they
found that fraud is more likely when there are fewer women, more insiders, and the CEO serves
as the chair of the board of directors (Roden et al., 2016). Although they did not dispute
Cressey’s fraud triangle theory, they concluded that attention should also be focused on the
corporate culture and the organizational make-up of the board of directors (Roden et al., 2016).
Accrual-related fraud theories. Narrowing down the discussion of financial statement
fraud theory to accrual-related financial statement fraud theory was the topic of Koch and Wall’s
(2000) study. They studied the actions of several CEOs during periods of sub-target earnings as
well as during the period right before they left the company. The use of discretionary
accruals/earnings management was found to be significant in both scenarios. The four accrualrelated fraud theories that came from the study include live for today, smooth income, maximize
variability, and the occasional big bath (Koch & Wall, 2000). Figure 2 summarizes the actions
of minimizing or maximizing discretionary accruals to achieve an intended result:
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Latent Earnings Above Target
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Figure 2: Possible Outcomes in the General Case. Adapted from (Koch & Wall, 2000).
Koch and Wall’s (2000) live for today theory explains a manager’s reasoning for
maximizing net income in the current period in order to meet a short-term target. Perhaps they
are not planning to be with the company much longer and are maximizing profit while they can
(Koch & Wall, 2000). The smooth income theory describes the manipulation of accruals to
provide a more stable earnings timeline (Koch & Wall, 2000; Zhang, 2016). The maximize
variability theory refers to a manager’s use of accruals to move further away from earnings
targets in order to prepare for an extraordinary future quarter; the under-reporting of current
earnings will make below-average future earnings appear fabulous (Koch & Wall, 2000).
Finally, the occasional big bath theory describes management’s motivation to inappropriately
record accruals in order to report an occasional windfall quarter (Koch & Wall, 2000). Their
findings add to the literature on linking earnings management fraud and compensation; in
addition, their conclusions add to the theoretical framework of this study, which seeks to link
accruals to financial statement fraud.
Healy and Wahlen (1999) reviewed the literature and found evidence of three reasons
that managers conduct earnings management fraud. The first is capital market motivations; their
study showed that some firms managed earnings for stock market purposes. However, the
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frequency and magnitude of earnings management for capital market purposes was not identified
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). The second incentive for managers’ earnings management related to
contract incentives. Management compensation and lending agreements are often tied to
earnings; therefore, there is an incentive to manage earnings to manipulate bonuses, ensure job
security, and adhere to debt covenants (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Dion, 2016). The final
motivation evident from their study related to regulatory motivations including government and
industry rules. Again, the frequency and magnitude of earnings management for this purpose
was not identified (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). All of the theories mentioned in this section provide
a theoretical framework that provided a foundation for the current study.
Agency theory. Beginning as an economic theory, agency theory has evolved to be one
of the leading theories in accounting literature (Murphy & Dacin, 2011). Agency theory, first
proposed by Mitnick (1973) and Ross (1973), seeks to define the relationship between a
principal (i.e., employer) and an agent (i.e., employee). Although the agent is hired to act in the
best interest of the principal, the theory states that the agent may act in his or her own selfinterest rather than in the best interest of the agent. This conflict is a result of differing goals and
attitudes of risk by the principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gerard & Weber, 2014). In an
attempt to resolve the agency problem of differing goals, agent compensation is often attached to
the earnings of a company (i.e., stock options or earnings bonuses). This creates an incentive for
the manager to manipulate earnings so that they (the agent) and the company/shareholders (the
principal) are both better off…until the fraud is uncovered (Dion, 2016; Healy & Wahlen, 1999).
While research shows that individuals may act more honestly than the agency theory suggests
(Salterio & Webb, 2006), company stakeholders should recognize the conflict explained by the
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agency theory and address the motivation to commit fraud created by management’s
employment contract.
The most recent research on agency theory as it applies specifically to accounting fraud
includes studies by Dion (2016) and Shi, Connelly, and Hoskisson (2016). Dion (2016) explored
executives’ opportunistic (fraudulent) behavior and applied characteristics of three philosophical
egoisms: self-interested yet compassionate (Adam Smith), self-interested and prudent yet
yearning for power (Thomas Hobbes), and self-interested while leading with power and
provoking fear in others (Machiavelli). His study found that executives with Smithian
characteristics are not likely to commit financial statement fraud because they balance their selfinterest with concern for others. Hobbesian executives are more inclined to commit financial
fraud than the Smithian executive because of their hunger for power. Executives with
Machiavellian tendencies are the most likely to commit financial statement fraud because of their
unclear understanding of virtue and vice (Dion, 2016).
Shi et al. (2016) also applied agency theory to accounting fraud in their study of external
corporate governance and financial statement fraud. They evaluated 265 cases of financial
statement fraud from 1999-2012 based on the SEC’s AAER database. The external corporate
governance variables tested included (a) dedicated institutional ownership (the ratio of total
shares held by dedicated institutional investors to total shares outstanding), (b) takeover defense
provisions (staggered board, limitation of amending bylaws and charter, supermajority to
approve a merger, golden parachute, and poison pill), and (c) analysts’ recommendation pressure
(sum of the average percent of sell recommendations and buy recommendations issued by
securities analysts; Shi et al., 2016). Although external corporate governance is implemented to
decrease the likelihood of corporate financial fraud, Shi et al. (2016) found these controls can
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actually increase the likelihood of financial fraud. These findings add to the literature on
financial statement fraud detection by identifying the likelihood of financial statement fraud
amid various provisions to prevent it.
Prospect theory. Originally proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), prospect theory
is an alternative to the expected utility theory that acknowledges the decision maker’s awareness
of risk based on sure gains or losses (certainty effect) and their tendency to isolate components
that are common among all options (isolation effect). The prospect theory breaks down the
decision process into two phases: editing and evaluation. In the first phase, options are coded,
combined, or cancelled based on their probable outcomes. Then, the options (prospects) are
evaluated based on their value and the option with the highest value is chosen (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). The prospect theory proposes that decision makers can be both risk averse and
risk seeking depending on the outcome of each option (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; AbdelKhalik, 2014). An option resulting in a gain makes the decision maker against taking on
additional risk that might mitigate the gain; on the other hand, an option resulting in a loss makes
the decision maker take on more risk in hopes of a larger payout (Abdel-Khalik, 2014). This is
against the rational choice theory that a loss would make one extra careful in decision making
(Abdel-Khalik, 2014). Thirteen years after the development of the prospect theory, Kahneman
and Tversky expanded their research on the subject and concluded that losses are two to twoand-a-half times more significant in decision making than gains of the same size (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992; Jiang, Lu, Shan, & Zhu, 2016). In other words, avoiding losses is a more
significant motivator in the commitment of fraud rather than the potential for gains.
Several notable studies have applied the concepts of prospect theory to accounting fraud.
Abdel-Khalik (2014) selected 60 accounting fraud cases from around the world that cost $200
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million or more of losses. His research concluded that the “risk-seeking behavior in the manner
predicted by the prospect theory is observable in the real world” (Abdel-Khalik, 2014, p. 81).
Jiang et al. (2016) evaluated companies to determine if accounts were manipulated to avoid
reporting negative working capital. Their results, concurring with the prospect theory, showed
that the negative assessment of working capital deficits “significantly outweighs the positive
assessment associated with reporting a working capital surplus of the same magnitude” (Jiang et
al., 2016, pp. 109-110).
In 2015, Wasiuzzaman, Sahafzadeh, and Nejad tested the influence of the prospect theory
on earning management activity. After using the earnings distribution model to test 538 firms
from 15 countries, they found that the prospect theory is applicable when explaining executive
motivation to manage earnings; however, it is not as effective when considering industries
separately. Industry characteristics such as competitiveness, profitability, leverage, and capital
intensity were found to influence managed earnings. They concluded that standard setters,
researchers, and stakeholders should “focus on both firm and industry-level variables when
assessing earnings management activities” (Wasiuzzaman et al., 2015, p. 344).
Most recently, Petrou and Procopiou (2016) applied the concepts of the prospect theory
to CEO shareholdings and earnings manipulation. Their research concluded that CEOs with
shareholdings are risk averse when it comes to earnings management. However, when the CEO
holds dual positions (chief executive and board chair) there is increased motivation to manipulate
earnings because of their powerful position (Petrou & Procopiou, 2016). They suggested that
corporate boards of directors evaluate executive compensation and governance systems to ensure
controls are in place to mitigate the chance of fraudulent earnings management (Petrou &
Procopiou, 2016).
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Motivated reasoning theory. Kunda (1990) was the first to explore the relationship
between reason and rationality. He proposed that decision makers are motivated to arrive at a
particular conclusion based on their “prior beliefs and expectancies” (Kunda, 1990, p. 480). The
motivations behind the decision makers’ actions may come from either the desire to be accurate
(accurate conclusion) or the desire to achieve a goal (directional conclusion; Kunda, 1990). In
the case of financial statement fraud, both accurate conclusions and directional conclusions can
cloud the judgement of the decision maker because financial statements must be accurate and are
expected to meet goals (Murphy & Dacin, 2011).
While most research on the motivated reasoning theory as it relates to accounting focuses
on auditors, Murphy and Dacin (2011) applied the motivated reasoning theory to fraudulent
behavior. Fraudsters rationalize their actions in order to rid themselves of guilt for doing the
wrong thing (Dellaportas, 2013; Murphy & Dacin, 2011). The motivated reasoning theory
considers two of the three parts of the fraud triangle: pressure (motivation) and rationalization
(reasoning). According to Murphy and Dacin (2011), justification comes from a variety of
sources including monetary rewards (improved standard of living), appearance of successfulness
(improved social status), moral justification (it may be wrong but it will benefit more than it will
hurt), and diffusion of responsibility (everyone does it; Murphy & Dacin, 2011).
Although fraud theory is a very broad subject, an understanding of the fraud triangle,
accrual-specific fraud theories, agency theory, prospect theory, and motivated reasoning theory
provides a framework to consult when assessing the likelihood of financial statement fraud.
Rational choices cannot be expected when it comes to corporate governance (Marnet, 2007).
The consideration of these theories will increase the efficiency of auditors, regulators, and
stakeholders in the corporate governance process (Marnet, 2007).
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Accruals in accounting research. This section of the literature review will visit the
most significant studies that have used accruals in accounting research while the section that
follows will focus specifically on using accruals to detect financial statement fraud. This first
section is a necessary addition to the literature review to show the importance of accruals in
various accounting research studies.
Paul M. Healy (1985) conducted one of the most notable studies on accruals. He
evaluated the relationship between accrual policies of managers and their bonus contracts in 250
of the largest U.S. industrial corporations. Of the 250 corporations, 94 companies made it in to
his sample because of their publicly disclosed bonus plan definitions. His study found a “strong
association between accruals and managers’ income-reporting incentives under their bonus
contracts” (Healy, 1985, p. 106). Healy’s work began a trend of accrual research regarding the
incentives related to the manipulation of accruals and recent accrual researchers often cite his
work.
Another research study of accruals investigated the relationship between cash flow,
accruals, and stock prices and concluded that stock prices do not fully reflect all publicly
available information due to accruals (Sloan, 1996). Sloan (1996) evaluated over 40,000 firmyear observations of financial statement and stock price data. Using earnings, accruals, and cash
flow from operations, his conclusions contradicted the traditional efficient market theory that
stock prices are an efficient way to reflect all publicly available information (Sloan, 1996).
Although a more recent study found that Sloan’s accrual anomaly may no longer be reliable in
today’s market (Green, Hand, & Soliman, 2011), his study has continued to be cited in decades
of accrual-related research because it can be applied to all publicly traded companies, not just
those with a specific circumstance.
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Jones (1991) studied the use of earnings management by domestic producers involved in
import-relief investigations by the U.S. International Trade Commission and found that
managers used discretionary accruals to manipulate income during import relief investigations.
The 23 firms studied were from five industries (automobiles, carbon steel, stainless and alloy
tool steel, copper, and footwear) and were being investigated for acts such as antidumping,
countervailing duty, and general escape clause damages. Jones (1991) presented a total accruals
model that accounts for changes in revenues, property/plant/equipment, and total assets. Her
model is often modified for specific research purposes (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995;
Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; Larcker & Richardson, 2004; McNichols, 2002).
Patricia M. Dechow has been a significant contributor to accrual research. Beginning in
1994, she studied earnings and cash flows as a measure of firm performance (Dechow, 1994).
By measuring the relationship between earnings, stock prices, and cash flows, she concluded that
accrual-based earnings “have a higher association with stock returns than do realized cash flows”
because of the timing and matching problems involved with cash basis accounting (Dechow,
1994, p. 35). Her 1994 study demonstrates the importance of accrual accounting and explains
why accrual-based earnings and expenses are reported to stakeholders rather than cash basis
reports (Dechow, 1994). In 2002, Dechow and Dichev investigated the quality of accruals based
on how well they turned in to cash flows. Their study found that firm characteristics (such as
volatility, operating cycle, firm size, reported losses, and level of accruals) can be used to judge
the quality of accruals and, in addition, connected Sloan’s 1996 study with Dechow’s earlier
1994 study to conclude that “large accruals signify low quality earnings and less persistent
earnings” (Dechow & Dichev, 2002, p. 54).
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Continuing on the foundation of accrual research provided by earlier scholars, Ayers et
al. (2006) explored the relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings benchmarks.
They found a direct relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings but could not
conclude the reasons behind this relationship (Ayers et al., 2006). Ghosh and Olsen (2009)
looked at the use of discretionary accruals during periods of external uncertainty and found that
managers use accruals to smooth earnings during periods of high external uncertainty; however,
the factors that signal high uncertainty are hard to define (Ghosh & Olsen, 2009). Their findings
supplement Dechow’s (1994) study, previously mentioned, which evaluated uncertainty related
to the firm’s internal environment (i.e., earnings and cash flows).
The relationship between accruals and cash flows was once again studied by Badertscher
et al. (2012). They examined managers’ motivations for using discretionary accruals including
opportunistic reasons, informational reasons, and contractual reasons. The “opportunistic”
incentive involves using discretionary accruals to disguise poor economic performance of the
firm. The “informational” use of accruals occurs in order to prepare for the future activities of
the firm. In addition, the “contractual” use of accruals attempts to minimize the contracting costs
in order to maximize firm value (Badertscher et al., 2012). Their findings suggest that the ability
of discretionary accruals to predict future cash flows varies depending on the motivation behind
the use of the discretionary accruals.
Research by Foster and Shastri (2013) looked at the relationship between accruals
(earnings management), material internal control weaknesses, and audit quality. They suggested
that auditors should extend the materiality threshold for firms with material internal control
weaknesses when testing accruals in order to mitigate earnings management risks (Foster &
Shastri, 2013). Adding to the literature on accruals and audits, Lustgarten and Shon (2013)
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examined how abnormal accruals may impact the life expectancy of an audit and found an
indirect relationship – when firms make large abnormal accruals, audit engagement life
expectancy decreases.
The most recent accrual research involves investment uncertainty (Arif, Marshall, &
Yohn, 2016), stock price crashes (Zhu, 2016), and cash flow disclosures (Miao, Teoh, & Zhu,
2016). Research by Arif et al. (2016) evaluated the relationship among accruals, length of
operating cycle, and firm uncertainty. They found that accruals increase as uncertainty increases
and is more evident for firms with longer operating cycles (Arif et al., 2016). Zhu (2016)
examined decades’ worth of financial information compared to stock price changes and found
that “high accruals predict a higher price crash probability than low accruals” (p. 349). One
explanation of this relationship was found to be due to “managers’ use of income increasing
accrual estimates to hoard bad news;” once the bad news is made public, the stock price crashes
(Zhu, 2016, p. 349). Miao et al. (2016) examined accruals, statement of cash flow disclosures,
and investor sophistication. He found a positive relationship between the thoroughness of the
statement of cash flow disclosures and the efficient pricing of accruals by investors (Miao et al.,
2016). In addition, less sophisticated investors need easily available cash flow disclosures for
their evaluation of accruals (Miao et al., 2016).
This section has summarized the most notable and most recent accounting research using
accruals. Following the suggestion of Jones et al. (2008), the present study will add to the
existing literature by considering the use of a revenue accruals quality ratio as an indicator of
financial statement fraud. An understanding of how accruals have been used in academic
research in the past provides information that will help choose the most appropriate accruals ratio
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for the present study. Figure 3 summarizes all studies noted in this section of the literature
review.
Researcher (s)
Arif, Marshall, & Yohn (2016)
Ayers, Jiang, & Yeung (2006)
Badertscher, Collins, & Lys (2012)
Dechow & Dichev (2002)
Dechow (1994)
Foster & Shastri (2013)
Ghosh & Olsen (2009)
Green, Hand, & Soliman (2011)
Jones (1991)
Lustgarten & Shon (2013)
Miao, Teoh, & Zhu (2016)
Sloan (1996)
Zhu (2016)

Topic
Abnormal accruals and firm uncertainty
Discretionary accruals and earnings targets
Discretionary accruals as a predictor of future cash flows
The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors
Earnings and cash flows as a measure of firm performance: The role of accruals
Materiality of abnormal accruals and internal control weaknesses
Environmental uncertainty and discretionary accruals
The apparent demise of Sloan's accruals anomaly
Earnings management during import relief investigations
Abnormal accruals and the life expectancy of audit engagements
Statement of Cash Flow disclosures and pricing of accruals
Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings?
Accruals and stock price crashes

Figure 3: Accruals in Accounting Research.
Accruals to detect financial statement fraud. This literature review section is perhaps
the most significant to this study as it summarizes the most relevant research that has tested
accruals as an indicator of financial statement fraud. The study of using accruals to detect
financial statement fraud is not necessarily a new idea. Two of the most significant accounting
researchers on the topic of accruals are Patricia M. Dechow and Richard G. Sloan.
Dechow and Sloan partnered up to study the use of accruals to detect earnings
management in perhaps the most notable research related to accruals and fraud (Dechow et al.,
1995). Their study on detecting earnings management considered “five models of the process
generating nondiscretionary accruals” (Dechow et al., 1995, p. 197). The Healy, Deangelo,
Jones, modified-Jones, and industry models were all tested with the results showing that the
Jones model “provides the most powerful tests of earnings management” (Dechow et al., 1995,
p. 223). Because of their findings, a modified version of the Jones model is often the basis for
accrual-related studies (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005; Larcker & Richardson, 2004).
Beneish (1999) presented a model to distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent
earnings management. His model uses the following indexes: number of days’ sales in
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receivables, gross margin, asset quality, selling/general/administrative expenses, sales growth,
depreciation, leverage, and total accruals to total assets (Beneish, 1999). His study found that
earnings manipulation “generally consists of artificial inflation of revenues or deflation of
expenses” and that the “primary characteristic of manipulators was that they had high growth
prior to periods during which manipulation was in force” (Beneish, 1999, p. 34). Dechow and
Dichev (2002) continued with the topic by incorporating accrual estimation errors into the study
of earnings management and found that “accrual quality is positively related to earnings
persistence” (p. 54).
Seventeen years after their first consideration of this topic, Dechow and Sloan partnered
up again to study the detection of earnings management and created a new approach that
“simultaneously improves test power and specification” (Dechow et al., 2012, p. 276). The new
study considers the “inherent characteristics of accrual-based earnings,” particularly the fact that
“accrual-based earnings management in one period must reverse in another period” (Dechow et
al., 2012, p. 276). Their study used the Healy model, the Jones model, the modified-Jones
model, the Dechow and Dichev model, and the McNichols model and found that “accrual-based
tests for earnings management can be significantly improved by incorporating accrual reversals”
(Dechow et al., 2012, p. 331). This approach should identify only the fraudulent accruals
(amounts that do not reverse in subsequent periods). Gerakos (2012) reviewed the new method
presented by Dechow et al. (2012) and found that it is a great addition to the literature on using
accruals to detect earnings manipulation by “introducing dynamics into the estimation of
discretionary accruals” (p. 346). However, he also raised several fundamental questions related
to the identification of accrual reversals, properties of nondiscretionary accruals, and the
dynamics of discretionary accruals.
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Jones et al. (2008) studied the relationship of accruals (earnings management) and
financial statement fraud that was similar to that of the 1995 study by Dechow et al. Using 118
firms charged with fraud by the SEC as their sample, they tested several discretionary accrual
models to determine their ability to detect earnings management fraud. The models included the
Jones model, the modified-Jones model, the modified-Jones model with book-to-market ratio
and cash flows, the modified-Jones model with ROA, the Dechow/Dichev measure of accrual
quality, the McNichols variation of Dechow/Dichev’s measure of accrual quality model, and the
Beneish model. Their study found that only two of the 10 models tested (Dechow/Dichev’s
measure of accrual quality and McNichols variation of Dechow/Dichev’s measure of accrual
quality) have “predictive power for both fraudulent and non-fraudulent restatement of earnings”
(Jones et al., 2008, p. 529). Their findings aid users of financial statements in understanding
accrual-based earnings management as well as auditors and regulators who are tasked to uncover
financial statement fraud.
Perols and Lougee (2011) added to the characteristics of fraudulent firms by finding a
direct relationship between prior earnings management and financial statement fraud. Through
their investigation of 108 firms that had been issued SEC AAERs, they applied a formula of
aggregated prior discretionary accruals and found that “firms that have previously managed
earnings are more likely to commit fraud even when there is no evidence of earnings
manipulation to meet or beat analyst forecasts or inflate revenue” (Perols & Lougee, 2011, p.
52). They suggested that future research is needed to provide direct evidence of the cause of this
relationship.
Dechow et al. (2011) evaluated 676 fraudulent firms to develop a model to predict
financial statement misstatements. By using the cross-sectional modified Jones model, the
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performance-matched discretionary accruals model, and the Dechow/Dichev model, they
analyzed the firms’ accruals and found that poor accrual quality is a likely indicator of earnings
manipulation. Also identified as common characteristics of fraudulent firms are declining
financial and nonfinancial firm performance, increasing cash sales, and increasing off-balancesheet financing (Dechow et al., 2011). Their findings add to the literature on the characteristics
of firms with fraudulent financial statements that aids regulators, auditors, and firm stakeholders
in identifying fraud risks.
D’Amico and Mafrolla (2013) used the Jones model and three modified-Jones models to
test accruals for a prediction of financial statement fraud and found that only one of the four
models, Larcker and Richardson’s (2004) modified-Jones model, accurately predicted earnings
management. Their findings disagree with an earlier study by Dechow et al. (1995) that found
the Jones model was a powerful predictor of financial statement fraud. This contradiction in
findings supports the need for more research in the area of accruals as an indicator of financial
statement fraud. Accruals were also found to be useful in the detection of financial statement
fraud in a study by Kim et al. (2016). In their evaluation of 40 different variables applied to
nearly 800 datasets, those related to accrual quality proved the most useful in the detection of
financial statement fraud (Kim et al., 2016).
Researcher(s)
D'Amico & Mafrolla (2013)
Dechow & Dichev (2002)
Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan (2011)
Dechow, Hutton, Kim & Sloan (2012)
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney (1995)
Gerakos (2012)
Jones, Krishnan, & Melendrez (2008)
Kim, Baik, & Cho (2016)
Perols & Lougee (2011)

Topic
Predicting financial statement fraud
Accrual quality and estimation errors
Characteristics of firms who commit financial statement fraud
Detecting fraudulent earnings management
Detecting earnings management
Review of Dechow, et al. (2012) New Method of detecting earnings management
Discretionary accruals ratios to detect financial statement fraud
Multiple variables tested to predict financial misstatements with fraud intention
Prior earnings management and financial statement fraud

Figure 4: Accruals to Detect Financial Statement Fraud.
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Research variables and accrual ratios. This quantitative, correlational study examined
the relationship between an accruals quality ratio and financial statement fraud. This section
discusses the accrual ratio variables previously used by researchers. Chosen for discussion
include accrual models by Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), Sloan (1996), Beneish (1999),
Dechow and Dichev (2002), Larcker and Richardson (2004), and Kothari et al. (2005).
Jones’s (1991) study examined the use of earnings management during situations in
which companies have an incentive to manipulate earnings, particularly during import relief
investigations. Her accruals model “relaxes the assumption that nondiscretionary accruals are
constant and...attempts to control for the effect of changes in a firm's economic circumstances on
nondiscretionary accruals” (Dechow et al., 1995). The Jones model is as follows:
TAt/At-1 = α[1/At-1] + β1[ΔREVt/At-1] + β2[PPEt/At-1] + et
where:
TAt = total accruals in year t = [∆Current Assets - ∆Cash] – [∆Current Liabilities –
Depreciation and Amortization Expense]
ΔREVt = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1;
PPEt = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t;
At-1 = total assets in year t-1;
et = error term in year t (assumed to be 0)
The Jones model assumes that revenues are nondiscretionary; therefore, the model removes the
discretionary accruals from revenues. Gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE) and change in
revenue (REV) are part of the model to control for the nondiscretionary accrual changes due to
varying economic conditions (Jones, 1991). Total accruals (TA) includes changes in working

44
capital accounts (i.e., accounts receivables, inventory, and accounts payable) since they depend
somewhat on changes in revenues (Jones, 1991).
A number of accrual-related studies adapt the Jones model to fit the objectives of each
individual project (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005; Larcker & Richardson, 2004;
McNichols, 2002). One example is the Dechow et al. (DSS; 1995) modified-Jones model. The
DSS modified-Jones model estimates discretionary accruals (instead of removing them) by
assuming that changes in accounts receivable resulted from earnings management because it is
easier to adjust earnings from credit sales than from cash sales (Dechow et al., 1995). They
found that their modified-Jones model was a better predictor of earnings management than other
models (Dechow et al., 1995; Ghosh & Olsen, 2009). The DSS modified-Jones model defines
nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) as follows:
NDAt = α1(1/At-1) + α2(ΔREVt - ∆RECt) + α3(PPEt)
where:
At-1 = total assets in year t-1;
∆REVt = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1;
ΔRECt = receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1;
PPEt = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t
Sloan (1996) conducted one of the earliest and most cited accrual-related studies. He
explored the accrual and cash flow components of financial statements and measured the extent
to which they are reflected in stock prices (Sloan, 1996). His study concluded that “firms with
relatively high (low) levels of accruals experience negative (positive) future abnormal stock
returns that are concentrated around future earnings announcements” (Sloan, 1996, p. 290). His
formula to calculate accruals is as follows:
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TAt = (∆CAt - ∆Casht) – (ΔCLt - ∆STDt – ΔTPt) – Dept
where:
TA = total accruals
∆CA = change in current assets
∆Cash = change in cash/cash equivalents
ΔCL = change in current liabilities
∆STD = change in debt included in current liabilities
ΔTP = change in income taxes payable
Dep = depreciation and amortization expense
Sloan excluded debt in current liabilities (STD) because it relates to the financing instead of
operating functions of the business. In addition, taxes payable (TP) is subtracted because they
are not a part of income from continuing operations as reported on the income statement (Sloan,
1996). Miao et al. (2016) recently used Sloan’s accrual model as part of their study of “the effect
of statement of cash flows disclosure on the market’s ability to efficiently price the accrual
component of reported earnings” (Miao et al., 2016, p. 510). They found that including cash
flow disclosures in the earnings announcements allows more investors (including the less
sophisticated investors) to include accrual information into their decision making and valuing of
the firm (Miao et al., 2016). As it relates to this study, Sloan’s model is not as specific as the
Jones model or the modified-Jones model because it does not account for discretionary accruals
or the relationship of accounts receivable to accrued earnings.
Using variables based on Healy (1985) and Jones (1991), Beneish (1999) created an
accrual model as part of his study to detect earnings management. His total accrual to total
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assets (TATA) model measures the extent to which cash backs reported earnings. His accrual
model is as follows:
TATAt = [∆CAt – ΔCasht - ∆CLt – ΔCLTDt - ∆TPt – D&At] / TAt
where:
∆CA = change in current assets
ΔCash = change in cash
∆CL = change in current liabilities
ΔCLTD = change in current maturities of long-term debt
∆TP = change in income tax payable
D&A = depreciation and amortization expense
TA = total assets
The TATA ratio is “often positive when revenue fraud is occurring” (Abassi et al., 2012,
p. 1303). In other words, higher accruals (less cash) signify an increased likelihood of earnings
manipulation (Beneish, 1999). After combining the results from all eight variables in his study,
he concluded that TATA was one of the most important indices for companies that improperly
recorded revenues through earnings management (Beneish, 1999; Roxas, 2011). While
discretionary accruals are not included in this model, his results “provide evidence of a
systematic relationship between the likelihood of manipulation and selected financial statement
data” (Jones et al., 2008).
Seven years after working with accruals and creating the DSS modified-Jones model,
Dechow collaborated with Dichev to measure the quality of accruals (the extent to which
accruals are eventually realized with cash flows). The Dechow/Dichev accruals earnings quality
metric recognizes that accruals should eventually match up with cash flows; therefore,
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“nondiscretionary accruals should be negatively correlated with contemporaneous cash flows and
positively correlated with adjacent cash flows” (Dechow et al., 2012). The Dechow/Dichev
model includes past, present, and future cash flow from operations (CFO) as variables (Dechow
& Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 2012). The DD model is stated as follows:
ΔWCt = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + et
where:
ΔWC = change in working capital
CFO = cash flow from operations
e = error term (assumed to be 0)
Their research concluded, “The standard deviation of the residuals is a firm-level
measurement of accrual quality, where a higher standard deviation denotes lower quality”
(Dechow & Dichev, 2002, p. 40). The Dechow/Dichev model has been proven a useful model
for measuring accrual quality related to timing difference between revenue recognition and cash
flow (Jones et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2012; Lustgarten & Shon, 2013).
Larcker and Richardson (2004) adapted Defond and Subramanyam’s (1998) modifiedJones accrual model to include the book-to-market (BM) ratio (to represent the expected growth
of the firm’s operations) and current cash flow from operations (CFO). The Larcker and
Richardson modified-Jones model is as follows:
TAt = α + β1(ΔSalest – ΔRECt) + β2PPEt + β3BMt + β4CFOt + et
where:
TA = total accruals
ΔSales = change in sales from previous year to current year
ΔREC = the difference in accounts receivable from beginning of year to end
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PPE = end of year gross property, plant, and equipment
BM = ratio of common equity book value to common equity market value
CFO = cash flow from operations
e = error term (assumed to be 0)
Larcker and Richardson consider their modified-Jones model to be more accurate and
useful than other accrual models because it “identifies unexpected accruals” and “identifies
discretionary accruals that are associated with lower future earnings” (Jones et al., 2008, pp. 502503).
The final accrual ratio discussed in this review of the literature is the Kothari, Leone, and
Wasley (KLW) modified-Jones model. As with most accrual-related research, the KLW model
is a modification of the Jones (1991) model. Kothari et al. (2005) argued that firm performance
is related to accruals; therefore, their calculation of total accruals includes return on assets
(ROA) as a measure of performance. The KLW performance-matched discretionary accruals
modified-Jones model is as follows:
TAt = β0 + β1(1/ATt-1) + β2(∆REVt – ΔARt) + β3PPEt + β4ROAt + et
where:
TA = total accruals
AT = total assets
∆REV = change in total sales from previous year to current year
ΔAR = change in receivables from previous year to current year
PPE = end of year gross property, plant, and equipment
ROA = income before extraordinary items divided by previous year’s total assets
e = error term (assumed to be 0)
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Kothari et al. (2005) experimented with both current year and prior-year ROA and found
that current-year ROA predicted earnings management better than prior-year ROA. Their
research found that their KLW model enhanced the reliability of suggestions of earnings
management (Jones et al., 2008). However, they also noted that their research only tested for
earnings management and their findings may not apply to other research situations such as fraud
(Kothari et al., 2005; Jones et al., 2008). In addition, a study by Dechow et al. (2011) found the
KLW model has “less power to identify manipulation than unadjusted accrual measures” and
suggest that controlling for things such as industry or performance (ROA) create significant
estimation error into the discretionary accruals model when used to detect fraud (pp. 19-20). For
these reasons, the KLW model was not chosen as the accrual variable in the current study.
Figure 5 summarizes the accrual models discussed in this section.
Researcher(s)
Jones (1991)
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney (1995)
Sloan (1996)
Beneish (1999)
Dechow & Dichev (2002)
Larcker & Richardson (2004)
Kothari, Leone, & Wasley (2005)

Accrual Model Description
Controlled for changes in a firm's economic circumstances and removes nondiscretionary accruals
Identified non-discretionary accruals
Measured the relationship between accruals and stock performance
Measured total assets to total accruals to predict financial statement fraud
Measured accrual quality related to timing differences between revenue recognition and cash flow
Included book-to-market ratio and current operations cash flow
Used ROA to predict earnings management

Figure 5: Accrual Models.
This quantitative, correlational study examined the relationship between accrual quality
and financial statement fraud. The accrual quality ratio chosen for this study was based on the
model provided by Dechow and Dichev (2002). This model was chosen because it recognized
that accruals should eventually match-up with cash flows and considers past, present, and future
cash flows. The Dechow/Dichev model has proven to be a useful model for measuring accrual
quality related to timing differences between revenue recognition and cash flows (Jones et al.,
2008; Dechow et al., 2012; Lustgarten & Shon, 2013). The second variable for this study is the
commitment of financial statement fraud. The SEC issues AAERs against firms when there is
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strong evidence of accounting manipulation. In general, firms that have been issued AAERs are
very likely guilty of financial statement manipulation and have already restated their earnings,
thereby admitting their guilt (Dechow et al., 2011).
Transition and Summary
Various forms of research, including professional and academic literature, cover accruals
and their use to detect financial statement fraud. Professional literature relevant to this study
includes the FASB’s ASU 2014-09 and Concept Statement No. 8, which provide authoritative
guidance on accounting for revenue and accruals. In addition, auditing standards and the SOX
Act of 2002 provide fieldwork guidelines for auditors as they test for financial statement fraud.
In particular, Auditing Standard 2110, SAS No. 99, AU§316.28, and various PCAOB regulations
relate directly to the current study. As stated in these guidelines, analytical procedures are
commonly used as an audit testing procedure. This study will add to the literature on using
analytical procedures as an indicator of financial statement fraud.
Academic literature was reviewed in areas including financial statement fraud, accruals
and earnings management, theoretical framework, accruals in accounting research, and using
accruals to detect fraud. Journal articles that focused on the detection of financial statement
fraud and, more specifically, using accruals to detect financial statement fraud were reviewed.
Accrual formulas that have previously been used in the study of financial statement fraud were
exhaustively reviewed and considered in the planning for the current study.
Research has indicated that there is a need for additional analytical indicators of financial
statement fraud (Abassi et al., 2012; Bolton & Hand, 2002; Golden et al., 2013; Kassem &
Higson, 2012; McMahon et al., 2016; Bian et al., 2016). This study will add to the literature on
the topic and help auditors, creditors, investors, and other stakeholders in their analysis of
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financial statements. The next section of this applied doctoral research project discusses the role
of the researcher, the participants, the research method and design, the population and sampling,
the data collection, the data analysis, and the reliability/validity of the study.
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Section 2: The Project
This section provides information on the research method and design of this applied
doctoral research project. Items included are: (a) purpose statement, (b) role of the researcher,
(c) participants, (d) research method and design, (e) population sampling, (f) data collection, (g)
data analysis, and (h) reliability and validity.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the relationship
between accrual quality and financial statement fraud. Prior research found that companies with
excessive accruals are more likely to produce fraudulent financial statements (Perols & Lougee,
2011). Although most companies will have revenue accruals as a normal part of business, this
study attempted to determine if an accruals ratio may be an appropriate detection measure for the
likelihood of financial statement fraud.
Role of the Researcher
In this quantitative, correlational study, the researcher collected and analyzed publicly
available archival data in order to address the research question regarding revenue accruals and
financial statement fraud. Unlike a qualitative study where the researcher is an instrument in the
study, there was no relationship with the participants. The researcher interpreted the results of
the statistical analysis and applied the findings to the hypotheses of this dissertation.
Participants
This research did not use any live subjects, only archival data. Data gathered were
obtained from the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases (AAER), a publicly available database. AAERs are actions taken against
firms that have strong evidence of accounting manipulation (Dechow et al., 2011) and are often
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used in financial statement fraud research. Information needed for this study was collected from
financial statements available through S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage, company websites, or the
publicly available SEC database. No confidential or personal information was collected for this
study.
Research Method and Design
This section covers the research method and design of this study. First, the applicability
of the quantitative research method to this study is discussed. Next, explanation as to why the
qualitative method and mixed-method approaches are not ideal for this study is provided.
Finally, the correlational design is addressed as the most appropriate design with a further
discussion on why other research designs were not conducive for this study.
Method
The quantitative method was chosen for this project because it involves the use of
statistically analyzed data to determine the relationship between variables (Creswell, 2014). The
quantitative method is very useful in accounting research as a way to interpret data for practical
use (Richardson, 2015). Quantitative research is appropriate for this study because the
theoretical framework is based on positive accounting theory, which includes the analysis of
archival data (Kabir, 2010). Statistical analysis will determine if there is a relationship between
the variables and, if so, to what extent (Stake, 2010). Many researchers in the fields of
accounting and financial statement analysis have used the quantitative method to measure the
relationship among variables with archival data that has been directly observed and evaluated
(Abassi et al., 2012).
Other research methods such as qualitative and mixed-method were not appropriate
because of the scope and intention of this study. Qualitative studies are subjective and
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situational (Stake, 2010) while this study involves the analysis of numerous instances of financial
statement fraud. The mixed method is a combination of qualitative and quantitative and is not
appropriate because this study is searching for a statistical relationship among variables
(Creswell, 2014).
Design
A correlational design was used to determine if a relationship exists between the accrual
quality and financial statement fraud. A correlational design fits the purpose of this study
because it describes the nature and magnitude of the relationship between the variables (Salkind,
2010). Comparing the accrual quality of companies with financial statement fraud to the accrual
quality of companies without financial statement fraud will determine if a statistically significant
relationship exists between these variables. Other quantitative designs that were not chosen
include the experimental and descriptive designs.
The experimental and quasi-experimental designs of quantitative research are not
appropriate for this study because there is no intervention with pre-tests and post-tests (Edmonds
& Kennedy, 2017). These designs call for independent, dependent, and control variables as well
as a control procedure with the intention of identifying a cause and effect relationship (Salkind,
2010). This study compares historical data from financial statements with no new intervention
or procedure to the data.
The descriptive design is used to explore a phenomenon and “describe what exists with
respect to the individual, group, or condition” (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017, p. 161). Generally,
with a descriptive design, a survey is administered to a random sample of a population or, if
feasible, an entire population (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017). Surveys are used to “observe trends,
attitudes, or opinions of the population of interest” (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017, p. 133). This
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study compares historical data (retrospective analysis) to determine the relationship between
variables. Therefore, the descriptive approach is not appropriate to address the research question
or test the hypothesis of this study.
Variables. The dependent variable for this study is commitment of financial statement
fraud. The SEC issues AAERs against firms when there is strong evidence of accounting
manipulation. In general, firms that have been issued AAERs are very likely guilty of financial
statement manipulation and have already restated their earnings, thereby admitting their guilt
(Dechow et al., 2011). As discussed in the following section regarding the population of the
study, AAERs are commonly used in accounting fraud research.
The independent variable chosen for this study is accrual quality based on the model
provided by Dechow and Dichev (2002). Dechow and Dichev created this model to measure
accrual quality and used the Pearson correlation to test it against existing theory in the areas of
firm operating cycle, firm size, sales volatility, cash flow volatility, accrual volatility, earnings
volatility, frequency of negative earnings, and magnitude of accruals. Furthermore, they
suggested that their accrual quality model could be tested to predict other applications of
earnings management, such as “accruals manipulated by management” (Dechow & Dichev,
2002, p. 46) which is the objective of this study.
The Dechow/Dichev 2002 model was chosen because it recognizes that accruals should
eventually match-up with cash flows and considers past, present, and future cash flows. This
model has been proven a useful model for measuring accrual quality related to timing differences
between revenue recognition and cash flows (Jones et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2012; Lustgarten
& Shon, 2013). For this study, an independent t-test was used to determine if there is a
statistically significant difference between the non-fraud standardized residuals and the
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fraudulent standardized residuals taken as two separate groups. Results from this analysis
address the research question and research hypotheses.
Population and Sampling
The SEC has been issuing AAERs since 1982 during or at the conclusion of an
investigation against an individual or entity for accounting misconduct (Dechow et al., 2011; Shi
et al., 2016). The SEC issues AAERs when there is strong evidence or admitted accounting
manipulation. Many accounting researchers rely on the AAER data to identify companies that
have committed financial statement fraud (Beneish, 1999; Dechow et al., 2011; Dechow et al.,
2012; Jones et al., 2008; Perols & Lougee, 2011; Roxas, 2011; Shi et al., 2016). The population
for this study consisted of firms that have been issued AAERs by the SEC for fraudulently
misstating their financial statements during the years 2015 and 2016. These two years were
chosen because they contain the most recent data available.
Purposive, criterion sampling was used to select the sample for this study. Purposive
sampling is used when the researcher selects participants based on a “specific need or purpose”
such as commitment of financial statement fraud (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017, p. 20).
Consistent with prior research (Beneish, 1999; Dechow et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2008), the
following AAERs were disregarded from the population of the study: (a) individuals, accounting
firms, and government/municipal agencies that were issued AAERs; (b) firms that were issued
AAERs for violations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977; (c) AAERs that were
issued against quarterly data rather than yearly data; and (d) firms that were public companies.
Removing these AAERs from the population leaves only those that were issued to companies for
financial statement fraud for a fiscal year.
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After applying these exclusion criteria to the 222 AAERs issued in 2015 and 2016,
seventeen firms remained. Data were collected from 100% of the eligible companies in the
sample. For each of the 17 fraudulent companies chosen for the study, a non-fraudulent
company was chosen for the non-fraud group based on the following inclusion criteria: (a)
similar in revenue size or market capitalization, (b) same industry (based on SIC industry code),
and (c) same fraud year as that of the fraudulent firms. Therefore, 34 companies made up the
sample in this study. Most of the companies were issued AAERs for more than one year
resulting in 40 firm-years evaluated for each group. The Dechow/Dichev accruals quality model
chosen as the independent variable for this study requires each observation to have prior-year,
current-year, and subsequent-year information. Therefore, 240 firm-year observations make up
the sample in the study.
Data Collection
Instruments
No specific data-gathering instruments were used in this study. The data used were
collected from publicly available historical data (the SEC’s EDGAR database) as well as the
subscription-based website S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage. The raw data were downloaded and
entered into IBM SPSS 24 Software to perform statistical analysis. A list of all raw data may be
obtained by contacting the researcher.
Data Collection Technique
Fraudulent financial statements were identified through the SEC’s 2015 and 2016 AAER
archives. While the SEC issues AAERs for companies, individuals, accounting firms, and
governmental/municipal agencies, purposive sampling was applied to the population leaving
only public companies with fraudulent financial statement activity in the sample. The researcher
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identified 17 fraudulent companies and 17 non-fraudulent companies as meeting the criteria for
this study and downloaded their data for the fraud year(s) into IBM SPSS 24 for statistical
analysis. The data used in the analysis were limited to what were obtained from the SEC
EDGAR database and the S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage database.
Data Organization Techniques
Data collected during this study were downloaded from the S&P Capital IQ
NetAdvantage software and/or the SEC EDGAR database to IBM SPSS 24. As recommended
by Stake (2010), working papers detailing the selection of the participants were also kept by the
researcher. The working papers acted as a reflective journal detailing the specific characteristics
of the firms chosen for the study as well as those excluded from the study. In addition, details of
the characteristics and reasoning behind the choices for the non-fraudulent companies were also
included in the reflective journal. The IBM SPSS 24 document was stored on a cloud server
(Microsoft OneDrive) and was backed up on a hard drive. The working papers were kept in the
researcher’s locked office.
Data were organized in IBM SPSS 24 to prepare for the statistical analysis. Relevant
company data were entered for each of the 40 fraudulent firm years as well as the 40
nonfraudulent firm years. This data included change in working capital for the current (fraud)
year (ΔWCt), prior period cash flow from operations (CFOt-1), current period cash flow from
operations (CFOt), and future period cash flow from operations (CFOt+1). As required by the
Dechow/Dichev model, the period for the collected data were the year of, the year before, and
the year after the fraudulent activity. Although the AAERs used were those issued in 2015 and
2016, the related fraudulent activity was perpetrated in years ranging from 2008-2013.
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Data Analysis Technique
The chosen data analysis techniques tested the difference in the revenue accruals quality
for companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without detected
financial statement fraud. After the financial statement data for each company was organized
into IBM SPSS 24, a regression analysis was applied to the non-fraudulent company data to
determine the coefficients for the accrual quality formula that would provide the best fit. ΔWCt
= Intercept + b0 * CFOt-1 + b1 * CFOt + b2 * CFOt+1. Next, the best fit regression coefficients
from the non-fraud companies were applied to both the fraudulent and non-fraudulent company
data to project an estimate for the change in working capital. Intercept + b0 * CFOt-1 + b1 *
CFOt + b2 * CFOt+1 = projected ΔWCt . Per the Dechow/Dichev accrual quality model, the
residual (the difference between the projected change in working capital and the actual change in
working capital) determines the quality of accruals. The method determines that a high standard
deviation of residuals indicates lower quality accruals and a low standard deviation of residuals
indicates higher quality accruals (Dechow & Dichev, 2002). Therefore, additional columns were
used to calculate the residual data for the fraudulent and non-fraudulent company data.
Because of the varying sizes of companies in the sample, the residuals of all companies
were then standardized in units of standard deviations based upon the variance of both groups
taken together (Salkind, 2013; see Figures 7 & 8). The Dechow/Dichev method states the
magnitude of the deviation, rather than the direction is significant (Dechow & Dichev, 2002);
therefore, the absolute value of the standardized residuals were generated. In order to test H1, a
difference analysis was conducted using an independent t-test to determine if there is a
statistically significant difference between the non-fraud standardized residuals and the
fraudulent standardized residuals taken as two separate groups.

60
Reliability and Validity
Issues with reliability and validity are concerns in all research studies (Edmonds &
Kennedy, 2017; Creswell, 2014). Reliability refers to the consistency of the researcher’s
approach compared to different researchers and studies (Gibbs, 2008) while validity is the
“extent to which the outcome accurately answer the stated research question(s) of the study” and
“measures what it is developed to measure” including the hypothesis presented in the study
(Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017, p. 4). The type of research and the instruments used in the study
will determine the specific threats to reliability and validity. The reliability and validity of this
study is discussed in the following paragraphs.
Reliability
In quantitative research, reliability refers to the accuracy of the data collected and the
ability of the results to be replicated (Creswell, 2014). The test-retest correlation and internal
consistency are two forms of determining reliability (Creswell, 2014). The use of statistical
analysis to test for financial statement fraud is a common practice in accounting research (Bolton
& Hand, 2002; Dechow et al., 2012; Gupta & Gill, 2012; Perols & Lougee, 2011) and should be
easily replicated (test-retest). This study did not involve any specific instruments for gathering
data (i.e., survey). All information was collected from public databases (i.e., SEC EDGAR and
company websites) or subscription-based services (i.e., S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage). When
available, the researcher compared the data to other sources to verify the information and make
the results of this study more reliable.
The use of commercial and/or public databases is common practice in accounting
research (Karpoff, Koester, Lee, & Martin, 2014). In particular, SEC AAERs are often used
when researching financial statement fraud as these are issued with evidence or admittance of

61
financial irregularities (Beneish, 1999; Dechow et al., 2011; Dechow et al., 2012; Jones et al.,
2008; Perols & Lougee, 2011; Roxas, 2011). While there is a chance of publicly available
archival data being inaccurate (Karpoff et al., 2014), the use of data from a federally regulated
agency (SEC) reduces the likelihood of incorrect data. In addition, subscription-based services,
such as the S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage software, have a profit incentive to keep their data
accurate.
Richardson (2015) studied the use of qualitative and quantitative methods in accounting
research and mentioned the use of commercial and/or public databases in his discussion. He
stated that researchers that rely on archival data should do so with a “critical perspective” (p. 73).
All data used in this study were collected from archival data sources and were, when possible,
verified with other third-party sources such as the companies’ websites. The research questions
in this study are suitable for archival data due to the abundance of financial information analyzed
and the implied reliability of federally regulated and subscription-based sources.
Validity
Quantitative research validity refers to the ability to draw “meaningful and useful
inferences” from the results of the study (Creswell, 2014, p. 160). It is impossible to design a
study that is free of any threat to validity (Creswell, 2014); however, the use of archival data
reduces validity threats that are present in other research designs (Smith, 2003). When
conducting quantitative research, Creswell (2014) suggested establishing content validity,
predictive validity, and construct validity.
Content validity refers to whether or not the study measures the content it was intended to
measure. Prior to choosing the specific accrual quality model that would be used as the variable
in this study, significant research was conducted to evaluate the most common models used in
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financial statement fraud research. The researcher chose the Dechow/Dichev model for this
study because of its applicability and historical accuracy in other fraud research studies. For
example, Jones et al. (2008) found of the 10 measures of earnings management they examined,
the Dechow/Dichev model and a modified Dechow/Dichev model were the only two that had
“predictive power for both fraudulent and non-fraudulent restatements of earnings” (p. 529). In
addition, Lustgarten and Shon (2013) used the Dechow/Dichev model to compare accrual quality
with life expectancy of audit engagements. The many uses of this model to test a variety of firm
characteristics made it an optimal choice for this study that will test yet another firm
characteristic: commitment of financial statement fraud.
Predictive validity refers to the re-testing ability of the measure and whether or not the
same results would be concluded. The use of publicly available company data strengthens the
predictive validity of the study and the small sample size creates an easily replicated study.
Construct validity refers to the usefulness of the findings in practice. This study will add to the
literature on financial statement fraud identification techniques and should prove useful in
practice for many different stakeholders.
Transition and Summary
This quantitative, correlational study examined the relationship between accruals quality
and financial statement fraud. The research method and design were chosen to address the
specific research question in this study. The accruals quality model variable was chosen due to
its applicability to the research question and its historical accuracy in other accounting research
studies. All reasonable steps were taken to mitigate reliability and validity threats that are part of
any similar research. Section 3 will discuss the findings of this study and its application to
professional practice.
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Section 3: Applications to Professional Practice and Implications for Change
Overview of Study
This study was conducted to address the need for additional financial statement fraud
detection techniques. Accrual quality was chosen as the focus of this study due to the high
likelihood of financial statement manipulation using accruals (Dechow et al., 2011; Mangala &
Kumari, 2015; Perols & Lougee, 2011). Using the Dechow/Dichev accrual quality model, this
study examined the relationship between accrual quality and financial statement fraud to
determine whether accrual quality may be used as an indicator of financial statement fraud.
Data were collected from SEC AAERs issued in 2015 and 2016. Using purposive,
criterion sampling, fraudulent companies were chosen from the AAERs and similar, nonfraudulent companies were chosen for the non-fraud group. The Dechow/Dichev model was
applied to the data to compare the accrual quality for each group. Then, the standardized
residuals produced for each group by the Dechow/Dichev model were used as the variables for
the analysis. In order to test H1, a difference analysis was conducted using an independent t-test
to determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the non-fraud standardized
residuals and the fraudulent standardized residuals taken as two separate groups.
Presentation of Findings
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the relationship
between accrual quality and financial statement fraud. Prior research found that companies with
excessive accruals are more likely to produce fraudulent financial statements (Perols & Lougee,
2011). While this study does not measure accrual size, it does measure the quality of the
accruals based on the recognition of accrued revenue in subsequent cash flows. Dechow and
Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality model was used as the foundation of the analysis for this study:
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ΔWCt = Intercept + b0 * CFOt-1 + b1 * CFOt + b2 * CFOt+1. Their formula takes into
consideration the changes in working capital (ΔWCt), prior period cash flow from operations
(CFOt-1), current period cash flow from operations (CFOt), and future period cash flow from
operations (CFOt+1). Their method determined that “the standard deviation of the residuals is a
firm-level measure of accrual quality, where a higher standard deviation denotes lower quality”
(Dechow & Dichev, 2002, p. 40). Their formula was found to be an accurate indicator of accrual
quality and has been used in many subsequent studies (Jones et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2012;
Lustgarten & Shon, 2013). This study takes the Dechow/Dichev model, applies it to the data,
calculates the standard deviation of the residuals, and applies a difference analysis using an
independent t-test to determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the nonfraud standardized residuals and the fraudulent standardized residuals taken as two separate
groups.
The sample was gathered from public companies that had been issued an AAER by the
SEC in 2015 or 2016 for misstating financial statements. Two hundred and twenty-two AAERS
were issued in 2015 and 2016. Of the 222 issued, 190 were excluded due to violations of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), accounting professional violations, and other nonfinancial statement related infractions. Of the remaining 32 companies, 15 were excluded based
on no subsequent data, misstatement of quarterly data (rather than annual data), or no similar
public company available for the non-fraud group. Once the final group of 17 fraud companies
was identified, similar non-fraud companies were chosen. Inclusion criteria used to identify
similar, non-fraud companies included revenue size, market capitalization, SIC industry codes,
and public company status. In total, 17 fraud and 17 non-fraud companies made up the final
sample and 100% of these companies were included in the study. Since companies were issued
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AAERs for fraud during multiple years, 80 firm year observations were included in this study
(40 in the fraud group and the same 40 firm years in the non-fraud group).
All statistical tests and analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS version 24. The
financial statement data were collected using the S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage database.
The change in working capital (ΔWC) and cash flow from operations for the three years needed
for the Dechow/Dichev formula (CFOt-1, CFOt, and CFOt+1) were collected from each
company’s financial reports (Form 10-K). The raw data for the fraud group and the non-fraud
group are provided in the Appendices.
Using the Dechow/Dichev model, a regression analysis was applied to the non-fraudulent
company data to determine the coefficients for the accrual quality formula that would provide the
best fit. ΔWCt = Intercept + b0 * CFOt-1 + b1 * CFOt + b2 * CFOt+1.

Intercept
CFOt-1
CFOt
CFOt+1
Figure 6: Coefficients.

Coefficients
-178753.6323
1.500574794
-1.048344296
0.242082647

Once the best fit regressions coefficients were identified, they were applied to both the
fraudulent and non-fraudulent company data to project an estimate for the change in working
capital:
ΔWCt = -178753.6323 + (1.500574794)CFOt-1 + (-1.048344296)CFOt + (0.242082647)CFOt+1

Figures 7 and 8 show the results after the application of the Dechow/Dichev formula on
the separate group data. The column titled ΔWCt lists the actual change in working capital for
the fraud year and the residuals column shows the difference in estimated ΔWCt and actual
ΔWCt. Following the Dechow/Dichev procedures for determining accrual quality, the standard
deviation of the residuals was calculated (see Figure 9).
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Due to the varying sizes of companies in the sample, the residuals of all companies were
standardized in units of standard deviations based upon the variance of both groups taken
together (Salkind, 2013). The Dechow/Dichev method states the magnitude of the deviation,
rather than the direction is significant (Dechow & Dichev, 2002), therefore, the absolute value of
the standardized residuals were generated.
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FRADULENT COMPANIES
(in thousands)

Company Name
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2009
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2010
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2011
FNCB Bancorp, Inc. FY2009
General Cable Corporation FY2008
General Cable Corporation FY2009
General Cable Corporation FY2010
General Cable Corporation FY2011
IEC Electronics Corp. FY2012
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2010
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2011
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2012
Keybanc Capital Markets, Inc. FY2010
Logitech International FY2012
Logitech International FY2013
Miller Energy Resources, Inc. FY 2010
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2007
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2008
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2009
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2010
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2011
Monsanto Company FY2009
Monsanto Company FY2010
Monsanto Company FY2011
Orrstown Financial Services, Inc. FY2010
Orrstown Financial Services, Inc. FY2011
Park National Corporation FY2010
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2012
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2013
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2014
St. Joe Company FY2009
St. Joe Company FY2010
Stein Mart, Inc. FY2010
Stein Mart, Inc. FY2011
The Phoenix Companies FY2010
The Phoenix Companies FY2011
Weatherford International FY2007
Weatherford International FY2008
Weatherford International FY2009
Weatherford International FY2010

RESIDUALS
∆WC t
(885,000) (1,037,248)
(418,000) (1,875,575)
(426,000) (1,357,769)
(12,433)
151,907
(155,100)
(215,789)
346,600
729,890
(144,200)
(705,084)
(141,300)
(78,814)
(4,763)
169,421
91,700
312,211
155,400
405,988
23,200
(219,089)
1,116,000
211,574
1,555
122,409
21,454
(21,201)
202,219
379,418
12,197
222,560
(43,141)
41,869
18,105
233,269
371
169,106
(16,389)
100,745
(1,240,000) (3,255,689)
(702,000) (3,094,167)
280,000
572,397
1,893
179,442
3,165
176,716
(8,794)
162,964
4,116
202,995
(14,457)
142,825
8,003
202,470
(23,167)
132,109
52,607
174,711
40,515
281,291
(18,537)
50,278
(515,800)
300,820
(263,800)
283,088
(863,599) (1,668,709)
(949,153) (1,070,409)
(515,715) (1,623,497)
(182,000)
55,795

Figure 7: Fraud Group Residuals (in thousands).

ABS
Standardized
Residual
1.442
2.608
1.888
0.211
0.300
1.015
0.980
0.110
0.236
0.434
0.565
0.305
0.294
0.170
0.029
0.528
0.309
0.058
0.324
0.235
0.140
4.527
4.303
0.796
0.250
0.246
0.227
0.282
0.199
0.282
0.184
0.243
0.391
0.070
0.418
0.394
2.320
1.488
2.258
0.078
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NON-FRAUDULENT COMPANIES
(in thousands)

Company Name
Harris Corp. FY2009
Harris Corp. FY2010
Harris Corp. FY2011
First Farmers & Merchants Corp. FY2009
Mueller Industries FY2008
Mueller Industries FY2009
Mueller Industries FY2010
Mueller Industries FY2011
Nortech Systems, Inc. FY2012
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2010
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2011
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2012
M&T Bank Corporation FY2010
Teradata Corporation FY2012
Teradata Corporation FY2013
PrimeEnergy Corporation FY2010
TESSCO Technologies FY2007
TESSCO Technologies FY2008
TESSCO Technologies FY2009
TESSCO Technologies FY2010
TESSCO Technologies FY2011
Icahn Enterprises FY2009
Icahn Enterprises FY2010
Icahn Enterprises FY2011
Citizens & Northern Corp. FY 2010
Citizens & Northern Corp. FY 2011
NBT Bancorp, Inc. FY2010
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2012
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2013
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2014
The InterGroup Corp. FY2009
The InterGroup Corp. FY2010
Stage Stores, Inc. FY2010
Stage Stores, Inc. FY2011
Primerica, Inc. FY2010
Primerica, Inc. FY2011
KBR, Inc. FY2007
KBR, Inc. FY2008
KBR, Inc. FY2009
KBR, Inc. FY2010

RESIDUALS
∆WC t
(14,700) (164,799)
46,600
(135,403)
(49,200) (408,054)
(14,848)
141,937
60,231
136,118
(7,737)
(40,244)
(56,279)
28,210
21,393
250,544
2,095
186,939
1,464,800
547,584
1,482,600
(428,110)
2,054,600
853,974
274,376
(4,013)
(53,000) (164,705)
(99,000) (413,037)
15,368
198,223
15,325
217,474
(7,473)
129,918
3,618
188,432
(2,772)
165,852
(3,625)
160,259
740,000
(48,539)
1,137,000
328,071
(3,106,000) (1,263,836)
9,322
196,287
4,672
163,418
9,272
179,451
2,700
235,856
47,100
119,140
(18,600)
(21,550)
3,379
183,489
(2,947)
170,496
(37,869)
22,155
(33,913)
91,418
(116,062) (990,307)
22,813
202,344
190,000
(798,310)
(320,000) (374,679)
(495,000) (672,961)
180,000
830,962

Figure 8: Non-Fraud Group Residuals (in thousands).

ABS
Standardized
Residuals
0.229
0.188
0.567
0.197
0.189
0.056
0.039
0.348
0.260
0.761
0.595
1.188
0.006
0.229
0.574
0.276
0.302
0.181
0.262
0.231
0.223
0.067
0.456
1.757
0.273
0.227
0.250
0.328
0.166
0.030
0.255
0.237
0.031
0.127
1.377
0.281
1.110
0.521
0.936
1.156
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The research question and hypotheses for this study were as follows:
Q1: To what extent does the revenue accruals quality differ for public companies with
detected financial statement fraud compared to public companies with no detected financial
statement fraud?
H10: There is no statistically significant difference in the revenue accruals quality ratio
for companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without
detected financial statement fraud.
H1a: There is a statistically significant difference in the revenue accruals quality ratio for
companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without
detected financial statement fraud.
Dechow/Dichev Model of Accrual Quality Results
The application of the Dechow/Dichev to each group provided the following results:

FRAUD group
NON-FRAUD group

Std Deviation
of Residuals
923,568
418,862

Figure 9: Standard Deviation Summary.
These numbers indicate the residuals for the fraud group are much more volatile than the
residuals for the non-fraud group. The Dechow/Dichev model measures accrual quality related
to timing differences between revenue recognition and cash flows (Jones et al., 2008; Dechow et
al., 2012; Lustgarten & Shon, 2013). Their research concluded, “The standard deviation of the
residuals is a firm-level measure of accrual quality, where a higher standard deviation denotes
lower quality” (Dechow & Dichev, 2002, p. 40). Therefore, the research question can be
answered by stating that the revenue accruals for the fraud group are lower quality than the
revenue accruals for the non-fraud group based on the Dechow/Dichev model. These findings
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indicated that there is a relationship between accrual quality for the fraud companies and the
non-fraud companies; therefore, additional testing is warranted.
Descriptive Statistics
Before conducting the independent t-test, descriptive statistics were created to determine
the quality and characteristics of the data.
Fraud Data
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Count

Non-Fraud Data
0.778
0.302
1.074
1.153
5.261
2.326
4.498
0.029
4.527
40.000

Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Count

Figure 10: Descriptive Statistics for each Data Set.

Figure 11: Fraud Data Frequency Distribution.

0.412
0.258
0.406
0.165
2.565
1.728
1.752
0.006
1.757
40.000
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Figure 12: Non-Fraud Data Frequency Distribution.
Of particular interest in the descriptive statistics is the standard deviation of each group
and the range of the two groups. The standard deviation of the fraudulent data is 1.074 while the
standard deviation of the non-fraudulent data is 0.406. In addition, the range of the fraudulent
data is 0.029 to 4.527. Since the data are standardized, values higher than three are considered
very unusual and values higher than four are considered extreme outliers (Salkind, 2013).
Notice, however, that the non-fraud group did not have any value higher than 1.757. The
following analysis will verify this preliminary assumption that these groups are distinctly
different.
T-test Results
An independent t-test was conducted to compare the fraud group standardized residuals
to the non-fraud group standardized residuals. Because the absolute value of the standardized
residuals was used, a 1-tailed t-test was appropriate. There was a significant difference in the
scores for the fraud group (M=0.778, SD=1.074) and the non-fraud group (M=0.412, SD=0.406)
conditions; t (78) = 2.017, p = 0.245. In other words, the difference in accrual quality for

72
fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms is statistically significant. Therefore, applying these results,
H10 can be rejected.
Summary of Findings
The use of the Dechow/Dichev model provided insight into the usefulness of using
accruals as an indicator of financial statement fraud by comparing the standard deviation of the
residuals. The fraud group’s standard deviation of the residuals was higher than the non-fraud
group’s standard deviation of the residuals indicating low quality accruals for the fraud group
data. The t-test results concluded that there is a statistically significant difference between the
accrual quality of the non-fraud group and the accrual quality of the fraud group. Therefore,
applying these results, H10 can be rejected.
Applications to Professional Practice
Accruals have been found to be high in years of fraudulent financial statements (Dechow
et al., 2011). In addition, Perols and Lougee (2011) found that companies with excessive
accruals are more likely to produce fraudulent financial statements. These researchers as well as
Mangala and Kumari (2015) and Sharma and Panigrahi (2012) recognized the need for
additional research in the area of accrual fraud indicators. The purpose of this quantitative,
correlational study was to determine if accruals quality could be used as a financial statement
fraud detection technique. The Dechow/Dichev model was used to compare accrual quality of
fraudulent financial statements with the accrual quality of non-fraudulent financial statements.
The findings suggested that, as expected, the accruals in the fraudulent financial statements were
of significantly lower quality than the accruals in the non-fraudulent financial statements. As a
group, there was a difference in the quality between fraud and non-fraud. It was not a predictor
or indicator for a specific company.
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The most practical application to professional practice for this study is for investors,
creditors, and other stakeholders to use the Dechow/Dichev model to measure accrual quality, as
it was intended to do, rather than use it as an indicator of financial statement fraud. Prior
research found that poor quality accruals could be related to the existence of fraud (Ayers et al.,
2006; Badertscher et al., 2012; D’Amico & Mafrolla, 2013; Dechow et al., 2012; Perols &
Lougee, 2011; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Dechow, 1994; Foster & Shastri, 2013; Gerakos, 2012).
This study also found a relationship between the Dechow/Dichev accrual quality model results
and the presence of financial statement fraud when viewed as a group.
This study adds to the accrual fraud detection literature by assessing accrual quality as a
fraud detection technique. The findings suggest that accrual quality may be a potential indicator
of financial statement fraud. Therefore, accountants should not mitigate the importance of
accrual quality nor dismiss the importance of accruals in financial statement analysis. Accruals
are a normal part of business and the subjective nature of many accrual transactions provides an
opportunity for easy financial statement manipulation.
Accountants must be trustworthy, honest, and reliable while following guidelines and
principles set forth by regulators and the profession’s governing agencies. Biblical concepts
cover ethical issues that may be applied to business situations to provide clarity to tough
situations, including fraud. Fraud is theft and God’s Ten Commandment’s instruct us not to steal
(Mark 10:19). Proverbs 20:17 states, “food gained by fraud tastes sweet, but one ends up with a
mouth full of gravel.” Also, Romans 13:1-4 instructs us to obey governing authorities and
regulations. Unfortunately, not all accountants and managers of financial information are
trustworthy and some turn to fraudulent activity.
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Pressure and rationalization are two of the fraud triangle theory characteristics that are
present when fraud occurs (Dellaportas, 2013) and are part of the theoretical framework of this
study. God’s word provides us with direction on how to overcome these characteristics of
fraudulent behavior. To mitigate financial pressure, Proverbs 3:9-10 instructs us to “honor the
Lord with your wealth…then your barns will be filled to overflowing, and your vats will brim
with new wine.” In other words, good financial stewards are rewarded. Rationalization is the
process of justifying a behavior. Fraudsters rationalize their actions; however, Matthew 16:26
relates to the rationalization of fraudulent behavior as the forfeiting of the soul. Putting God first
and removing the idolatry of monetary and social success reduces the pressure and
rationalization present during fraudulent activity (Albertson, 2016).
We Christians are instructed to live our lives with honesty and integrity (Matthew 5:8,
Proverbs 21:3, Psalm 25:21, & Psalm 112) and these characteristics should flow through to all
areas of our lives, including our businesses. We are called to “always strive to do what is good
for each other and for everyone else” in all parts of our lives (1 Thessalonians 5:15). Regarding
the biblical framework related to this study, the findings emphasize the continued need for
checks and balances within the accounting profession. Using tools that have been tested and
proven effective, such as the Dechow/Dichev accrual quality model, we can aid authorities,
auditors, and management in the detection of fraud. By detecting financial statement fraud, we
are providing useful and accurate information for all stakeholders’ decision-making. These
actions allow our communities to continue to flourish (Van Duzer, 2010).
Concerning the cognate field of accounting, this study adds to the literature on fraudulent
financial statement detection. The manipulation of financial statements is the costliest type of
fraud in the workplace (ACFE, 2016). Our capital markets and individual company stakeholders
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rely on accurate financial statements for decision-making. The application of the results of fraud
theory research, accrual quality research, and financial statement fraud detection research
strengthens the data used for decision-making, therefore strengthening our capital markets as a
whole.
Recommendations for Action
Users of financial statements include investors, analysts, auditors, regulators, and other
stakeholders of businesses. The capital markets rely on the accuracy of information provided in
financial statements. The results of this study can be of use to all stakeholders of businesses who
are looking for indicators of financial statement quality. The Dechow/Dichev model may be a
reliable indicator of the quality of the accruals presented which is an important characteristic to
consider when analyzing financial statements.
One recommended action is to increase awareness of the many models of accrual quality
and their usefulness in financial statement analysis. Accountants, analysts, and auditors have
access to a plethora of publications that cover their particular area of accounting. The AICPA
and FASB websites send out regulation updates regularly as well as publications for use in
accounting practice. In addition, organizations such as the National Society of Accountings
(NSA), Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors, and state CPA agencies publish newsletters and
magazines reporting recent findings in accounting research. The results of this study could be
disseminated through any of these means in order to increase awareness of and application of
accrual quality models.
Recommendations for Further Study
Accounting research is continually developing to identify more ways to uncover
fraudulent financial statement activity. Despite the variety of fraud detection literature, a gap
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exists regarding the detection of fraudulent financial reporting related specifically to revenue
accrual misstatements (Dechow et al., 2011; Mangala & Kumari, 2015; Perols & Lougee, 2011).
Further research should focus on finding additional indicators of financial statement fraud by
applying existing accrual models such as Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), Beneish (1999),
Larcker and Richardson (2004), Kothari et al. (2005), or by creating models yet to be identified.
Future studies should include expanding the periods used to include more years of AAERs
issued. In addition, specific industries could be analyzed separately to identify normal accrual
levels for particular markets. Finally, this study found that as a group there was a difference in
the quality between fraud and non-fraud. The results were not a predictor or indicator for a
specific company. A study is needed that could provide the missing link in detecting potential
fraud in a way that could predict fraud in individual companies rather than the two groups.
Reflections
The results of this study were what I expected. The Dechow/Dichev model proved to be
effective in estimating fraudulent accrual quality to be lower than non-fraudulent accrual quality;
in addition, I anticipated that low accrual quality would be an indication of financial statement
fraud. Since accruals are subjective and easy to manipulate and have been found to be of low
quality in years of financial statement fraud (Perols & Lougee, 2011), it seemed logical that they
could be used as a detection technique. Accruals are an easy avenue to commit fraud and should
continue to be analyzed in order to find an analytical procedure that proves to be useful for the
detection of financial statement fraud.
I have been on the doctoral journey for three years and this dissertation has been a part of
my life for the past year. The research process was strenuous, but not unbearable. My biggest
challenge was time management. The most demanding and time-intensive requirement was the
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literature review and theoretical framework. While the data collection also required a lot of time,
I thoroughly enjoyed digging through financial statements and gathering the data. Since this
study used archival data, I do not feel as if any personal biases were introduced in the data
collection process.
As I reflect on this accounting research, I am reminded that accounting is the language of
business. Just as we have different words for the same objects (e.g., automobile/vehicle,
house/home, trip/vacation, child/kid, etc.) we can also have different applications of accounting
rules. Different accountants may interpret some of the accounting language, or rules, differently
while still being legally applied. These subjective applications of rules and estimates make it
difficult to compare the financial results of businesses. Therefore, we must do the best we can
with the analytical tools we have. This study attempted to add to our collection of financial
statement analysis tools regarding accruals, one of the most subjective areas of financial
statements.
Biblically, this study follows the passage found in Proverbs 27:17, “As iron sharpens
iron, so one person sharpens another.” Accounting research, just like any subject, relies heavily
on existing literature and those researchers who have a passion in the same area as their own.
Each study added to the existing literature improves the information available to those who
follow us in the profession. In addition, each study related to financial misstatement improves
the efficiency of detecting fraud which improves our capital markets overall. It is my hope that
this study is one piece of iron that sharpens others in order to strengthen accounting literature and
the profession as a whole.
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Summary and Study Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to add to the literature regarding financial statement fraud
detection techniques by examining the relationship between accrual quality and financial
statement fraud. The Dechow/Dichev model has proven to be an effective model in predicting
accrual quality and, therefore, was chosen as the accrual model for this study. Data were
collected from SEC AAERs issued in 2015 and 2016. Using purposive, criterion sampling,
fraudulent companies were chosen from the AAERs and similar, non-fraudulent companies were
chosen for the non-fraud group. The Dechow/Dichev model was applied to the data to compare
the accrual quality for each group. Then, the standardized residuals produced for each group by
the Dechow/Dichev model were used as the variables for the correlation analysis. An
independent t-test was conducted to examine the relationship between accrual quality and
financial statement fraud. The results indicated that the Dechow/Dichev model estimated accrual
quality lower for fraudulent companies and low accrual quality might be considered an indicator
of fraudulent activity. Significant difference was found in the revenue accrual quality for
companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without detected
financial statement fraud. Research on the topic of accounting fraud detection techniques should
continue with additional tests to aid auditors, regulators, and other stakeholders in making
informed decisions when using financial statement data.
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Appendix A: Non-Fraud Group Data

NON-FRAUDULENT COMPANIES
(in thousands)

Company Name
Harris Corp. FY2009
Harris Corp. FY2010
Harris Corp. FY2011
First Farmers & Merchants Corp. FY2009
Mueller Industries FY2008
Mueller Industries FY2009
Mueller Industries FY2010
Mueller Industries FY2011
Nortech Systems, Inc. FY2012
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2010
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2011
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2012
M&T Bank Corporation FY2010
Teradata Corporation FY2012
Teradata Corporation FY2013
PrimeEnergy Corporation FY2010
TESSCO Technologies FY2007
TESSCO Technologies FY2008
TESSCO Technologies FY2009
TESSCO Technologies FY2010
TESSCO Technologies FY2011
Icahn Enterprises FY2009
Icahn Enterprises FY2010
Icahn Enterprises FY2011
Citizens & Northern Corp. FY 2010
Citizens & Northern Corp. FY 2011
NBT Bancorp, Inc. FY2010
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2012
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2013
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2014
The InterGroup Corp. FY2009
The InterGroup Corp. FY2010
Stage Stores, Inc. FY2010
Stage Stores, Inc. FY2011
Primerica, Inc. FY2010
Primerica, Inc. FY2011
KBR, Inc. FY2007
KBR, Inc. FY2008
KBR, Inc. FY2009
KBR, Inc. FY2010

CFO t-1
555,500
666,800
802,700
10,515
185,844
185,760
77,388
56,357
(874)
2,243,000
2,791,000
2,713,300
1,189,389
513,000
575,000
34,060
3,318
28,026
4,160
15,156
14,811
893,000
365,000
41,000
12,968
35,046
54,684
55,900
167,100
152,400
3,092
7,032
120,936
77,875
716,344
41,057
931,000
248,000
124,000
(36,000)

CFO t
666,800
802,700
833,100
(3,866)
185,760
77,388
56,357
153,749
4,622
2,791,700
2,713,300
3,080,900
1,675,647
575,000
510,000
62,211
28,026
4,160
15,156
14,811
12,038
365,000
41,000
1,995,000
35,046
37,464
89,437
167,100
152,400
65,000
7,032
5,684
77,875
78,055
41,057
87,215
248,000
124,000
(36,000)
549,000

CFO t+1
∆WC t
802,700
(14,700)
833,100
46,600
852,900
(49,200)
8,828
(14,848)
77,388
60,231
56,357
(7,737)
153,749
(56,279)
108,297
21,393
276
2,095
2,713,300
1,464,800
3,080,900
1,482,600
2,221,200
2,054,600
1,772,246
274,376
510,000
(53,000)
680,000
(99,000)
41,339
15,368
4,160
15,325
15,156
(7,473)
14,811
3,618
12,038
(2,772)
21,746
(3,625)
41,000
740,000
1,995,000
1,137,000
1,514,000 (3,106,000)
37,464
9,322
27,652
4,672
83,765
9,272
152,400
2,700
65,000
47,100
87,400
(18,600)
5,684
3,379
2,965
(2,947)
78,055
(37,869)
75,981
(33,913)
87,215
(116,062)
119,978
22,813
124,000
190,000
(36,000)
(320,000)
549,000
(495,000)
650,000
180,000
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Appendix B: Fraud Group Data
FRADULENT COMPANIES
(in thousands)

Company Name
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2009
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2010
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2011
FNCB Bancorp, Inc. FY2009
General Cable Corporation FY2008
General Cable Corporation FY2009
General Cable Corporation FY2010
General Cable Corporation FY2011
IEC Electronics Corp. FY2012
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2010
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2011
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2012
Keybanc Capital Markets, Inc. FY2010
Logitech International FY2012
Logitech International FY2013
Miller Energy Resources, Inc. FY 2010
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2007
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2008
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2009
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2010
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2011
Monsanto Company FY2009
Monsanto Company FY2010
Monsanto Company FY2011
Orrstown Financial Services, Inc. FY2010
Orrstown Financial Services, Inc. FY2011
Park National Corporation FY2010
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2012
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2013
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2014
St. Joe Company FY2009
St. Joe Company FY2010
Stein Mart, Inc. FY2010
Stein Mart, Inc. FY2011
The Phoenix Companies FY2010
The Phoenix Companies FY2011
Weatherford International FY2007
Weatherford International FY2008
Weatherford International FY2009
Weatherford International FY2010

CFO t-1
1,343,000
1,986,000
1,643,000
11,215
231,700
229,400
546,300
98,900
12,806
17,400
113,000
209,000
2,320,000
156,742
196,142
(1,721)
16,636
52,627
(5,792)
35,943
41,148
2,799,000
2,236,000
1,398,000
12,511
24,808
72,338
(5,481)
10,852
(2,164)
48,459
50,735
19,356
98,329
(583,000)
(258,000)
1,087,019
872,506
1,104,568
614,322

CFO t
1,986,000
1,643,000
1,564,000
3,641
229,400
546,300
98,900
97,300
12,970
113,000
209,000
(92,100)
2,724,000
196,142
116,990
(2,160)
52,627
(5,792)
35,943
41,148
(3,217)
2,236,000
1,398,000
2,814,000
24,808
34,855
126,134
10,852
(2,164)
12,056
50,735
16,312
98,329
49,632
(258,000)
(138,400)
872,506
1,104,568
614,322
1,128,000

CFO t+1
∆WC t
1,643,000
(885,000)
1,564,000
(418,000)
1,176,000
(426,000)
5,792
(12,433)
546,300
(155,100)
98,900
346,600
97,300
(144,200)
288,600
(141,300)
(4,338)
(4,763)
209,000
91,700
(92,100)
155,400
44,900
23,200
1,890,000 1,116,000
116,990
1,555
205,421
21,454
7,734
202,219
(5,792)
12,197
35,943
(43,141)
41,148
18,105
(3,217)
371
(14,452)
(16,389)
1,398,000 (1,240,000)
2,814,000
(702,000)
3,051,000
280,000
34,855
1,893
18,658
3,165
126,731
(8,794)
(2,164)
4,116
12,056
(14,457)
713
8,003
16,312
(23,167)
(9,839)
52,607
49,632
40,515
59,568
(18,537)
(138,400)
(515,800)
(520,800)
(263,800)
1,104,568
(863,599)
614,322
(949,153)
1,128,000
(515,715)
833,000
(182,000)

